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1 Introduction 
1.1 Subjects of the Thesis 
The subjects of this thesis are intervention by the Norwegian State in incidents of acute 
marine oil pollution and public claims for reimbursement subsequent to the governmental 
intervention.       
 
In this thesis, state intervention will mainly be used as a collective term, referring to both 
the situation where public authorities order a private party to initiate certain measures and 
the situation where the public authorities implement measures on behalf of a private party 
themselves. The reimbursement claim is the claim set forth by the government for the pur-
pose of covering the expenses incurred after having implemented the measures. 
 
Although the perspective applied is the State’s point of view, it is also necessary to give 
account for the most significant duties and responsibilities that rest with other parties and 
stakeholders in the occurrence of acute oil pollution. That is, because it provides both the 
factual and legal backdrop on which the intervention- and reimbursement claim issues are 
based, and are therefore instrumental in bringing about the issues concerning the State’s 
role. As a consequence, preparedness against acute pollution and the responsible person’s 
duty to take action will also be subject to thorough examination.    
 
This topic has proven highly relevant, both through the recent decades and until present 
day. By and large, environmental protection has been subject to increased focus over the 
recent years as a recurring topic in any area of law, as well as in the society as such. Mari-
time law is no exception, and there have been several initiatives both internationally and 
domestically aiming to prevent pollution from vessels.
1
 In this respect, the centre of atten-
                                                 
 
1
  As the thesis concerns vessel-source pollution, oil pollution from ships regarded as facilities 
 pursuant to the Petroleum Act §7-1 will not be addressed.   
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tion has been oil pollution, partly because of the devastating effects evidenced following 
major disasters such as the accidents concerning the tanker vessels Exxon Valdez-, Erica 
and the Prestige. Norway has been spared for similar major oil spill incidents, although 
some significant occurrences have taken place in Norwegian waters.  
 
In accidents involving a risk of oil pollution, it is customary that the government intervenes 
and, if considered necessary, undertakes the management of the operation and subsequently 
seeks reimbursement from the liable party. This intervention is, as a starting point, in the 
interest of all affected parties. The State, on behalf of the society, has a general desire to 
protect the environment. The party causing the accident is in need of assistance as he or she 
rarely is able to undertake such advanced and demanding measures, as it would neither be 
practical nor economically viable. The position of innocent third parties affected by the 
pollution is also strengthened when the State guarantee to undertake the operation and im-
plement necessary measures. As the State assumes responsibility for and carries out the 
operation on behalf of the liable party, it is important that the service is performed in a sat-
isfactory manner. Since the costs connected to state intervention – which the polluter even-
tually becomes responsible for – may be massive, the polluter often has strong opinions 
regarding which measures and equipment that should be utilised. 
 
In relation to this, several legal issues arise. For one, there are questions concerning the 
extent of the government’s authority, that is, the kind of measures they have competence to 
impose and carry out, and under which circumstances. Another issue, that has proven 
equally contentious, is the extent and size of the State’s reimbursement claim. In the after-
math of a governmental intervention, disputes tend to arise. There are often disagreements 
between the affected parties, typically between the Coastal Administration and the Reder, 
concerning what expenses that can reasonably be included and how the reimbursement 
claim should be calculated. The current relevance of these issues is evidenced by recent 
judgments and cases that are scheduled to proceed before Norwegian courts in the near 
future.  
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1.2 Legal Sources and Methodology  
1.2.1 Introduction 
This thesis will apply traditional Norwegian legal method. When discussing the topic of 
state intervention and claim for reimbursement relating to oil pollution, the point of depar-
ture is the ordinary legal sources of maritime, environmental and pollution law. Thus, both 
legislation, including regulations, preparatory works, case law and legal theory will be of 
central importance. Additionally, certain sources from foreign jurisdictions may, depending 
on the circumstances, be relevant sources of law.    
 
1.2.2 Legislation 
With respect to pollution law, the main piece of legislation is the “Act relating to protection 
against pollution and relating to waste of 13. March 1981 no. 6” (henceforth referred to as 
the Pollution Act or PA). The Pollution Act is very comprehensive and applies in principle 
to all types of pollution, regardless of source. In this thesis, the relevant provisions are pri-
marily found in chapters 6 and 9, which concerns acute pollution and administrative deci-
sions made pursuant to the act. To some extent, chapter 8 will also be discussed. This chap-
ter concerns compensation for pollution damage, and was included by “act 16. June 1989 
no 67”. The thesis will examine the system provided by the Pollution Act and how it ap-
plies to marine oil pollution.  
 
Additionally, there are other regulations that concerns maritime oil pollution more specifi-
cally, and these rules will to a certain extent overlap and sometimes take priority over the 
rules set forth in the Pollution Act. In this thesis, the relevant special regulation is the 
“Norwegian Maritime Code of 24. June 1994 no. 39” (henceforth referred to as the Mari-
time Code or MC), chapters 9 and 10. The regulations in chapter 10 were implemented in 
the Maritime Code of 1893 by “act 20. December 1974 no 69”, and maintained in the MC 
of 1994. Several amendments have subsequently been carried out, primarily by “act 17. 
March 1995 no 13”, “act 27. February 2004 no 10” and “act 21. December 2007 no 128”. 
The regulations in chapter 9 have also been subject to amendments, most importantly by 
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“act 27. May 1983 no 30”, “act 7. January 2000 no 2”, “act 17. June 2005 no 88” and “act 
12. June 2009 no 37”.2  
 
While the Pollution Act is the point of departure for most questions concerning state inter-
vention and the claim for reimbursement, the Maritime Code is central for issues concern-
ing reimbursement and limitation of liability.  
 
There is reason to highlight that the relevant provisions in the MC chapter 10 primarily are 
a result of the implementation of the “International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage 1992” (henceforth referred to as the Liability Convention) and the “In-
ternational Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001” (hence-
forth referred to as the Bunker Convention). MC chapter 9 is to a large extent founded on 
the “London Convention 1976 on Limitation of Liability on Maritime Claims”, as amended 
by the 1996 Protocol. These conventions, and the appurtenant guidelines, will accordingly 
be influential when interpreting the legislation.  
 
1.2.3 Preparatory works 
The travaux preparatoires of the respective legislation represent significant legal sources. 
With respect to the Pollution Act, the most important preparatory works for the purpose of 
this thesis are NUT 1977:1, NOU 1977:11 and Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980). The Maritime 
Code has an extensive amount of preparatory works, due to the fact that it has been amend-
ed and revised several times. In this thesis, NOU 2002:15 and Ot.prp.nr.77 (2006-2007) are 
the most utilised documents.       
  
                                                 
 
2
  The many amendments have caused some practical difficulties when determining which set of rules
 that apply, cf. Rt-2007-246 (Rocknes).  
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1.2.4 Case law 
Seeing that the legislation and its preparatory works to a large extent are of a generic char-
acter and do not specifically concern the issues that are raised in this thesis, case law is an 
important legal source. However, there are not many cases that directly concern the issues 
that will be raised. There are a few judgments on issues pertaining to reimbursement, which 
implicitly also demonstrates questions of state intervention. Furthermore, some criminal 
law cases are illustrating for the duty to take action.   
 
1.2.5 Legal theory 
There is limited legal theory with regard to the specific issues of state intervention and 
claims for reimbursement. However, there are some publications providing a more general 
approach to pollution- and maritime law. Reference can be made to Bugge (1999) and Fal-
kanger/Bull (2010).  
 
1.2.6 International sources of law 
Considering the special nature of the areas of law addressed in this thesis, certain legal 
sources from foreign jurisdictions might also be of relevance, because the Maritime Code is 
a product of a legislative collaboration between the Nordic countries.
3
 Generally, when 
there has been such a joint legislative process, it will be of considerable interest to examine 
how the legislation has been practiced by the courts in these jurisdictions.
4
  
 
The collective Nordic effort within the area of maritime law is – and has been – particularly 
close. Besides the legislation itself, the Scandinavian countries have established a common 
compilation of case reports titled “Nordiske Domme i Sjøfartsanliggender” (henceforth 
referred to as ND). The report is published by Nordisk Defence Club and has reported the 
                                                 
 
3
  Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset (2011) p. 26. 
4
  Nygaard (2004) p. 220.  
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most significant maritime cases decided in Scandinavia since 1900.
5
 Thus, cases from these 
jurisdictions will be of relevance. They will also be ascribed more legal authority than what 
is customary, because there has been legislative collaboration and the easy accessibility of 
other Scandinavian case law.
6
 Additionally, the Scandinavian Maritime Codes are to a 
large extent based on the same conventions.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is not of interest to examine how issues pertaining to pollu-
tion law are regulated in other jurisdictions, and this will therefore not be addressed. The 
Maritime Code, on the other hand, is similar in many other jurisdictions because of the in-
ternational conventions on this field, and could therefore be a relevant study.
7
 However, the 
state of law in other jurisdictions will not be pursued.     
 
1.2.7 Other methodological issues and the term “Reder/Rederi” 
Seeing that the vast majority of available legal sources are officially published in Norwe-
gian only, quite a few translations have been necessitated. Certain sources are, however, 
translated into English by the public authorities, and published on their websites.
8
 There are 
also sources that are unofficially translated, such as those provided by the Faculty of Law 
and can be obtained electronically through the University of Oslo Library.
9
 With respect to 
the Maritime Code specifically, the preferred translation has been the one published in 
“MarIus” by the Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law.10 Accordingly, provided that 
there are available translated sources, these translated versions will be utilised. The sources 
that cannot be found in an English translation have been translated by the authors.  
                                                 
 
5
  Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset (2011) p. 31. 
6
  Falkanger (2012) I note *.  
7
  Some states are not party to the Conventions, e.g. the US which have chosen a different regulation,
 see the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.  
8
  See www.government.no   
9
  See http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulov/english.html  
10
  MarIus 393 (2010). 
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The Norwegian terms Reder/Rederi are difficult to translate into English in a satisfactory 
manner, as there exists no equivalent English term.
11
 The term Reder is used both in every-
day language, as well as in legal terminology, when referring to the person who operates 
the ship or runs the vessel for his own account.
12
 The related term Rederi, on the other 
hand, refers to the company that operates the ship, inter alia a partnership, limited liability 
company or corporation. However, the term may have different content depending on the 
circumstances and the applicable regulation.
13
   
 
For practical purposes, the term Reder will in this thesis consequently correspond to the 
term shipowner, while the term Rederi will be equal to the term shipowning company. 
There are, however, some significant exceptions that should be borne in mind, namely ves-
sels that are on demise or bareboat charter or vessels that have been requisitioned.
14
 In 
these situations, the charterer or the party requisitioning are responsible for manning and 
equipping the vessel and operates it for their own account.
15
 Thus, he will be regarded as 
the Reder and becomes the owner pro hac vice.     
 
Although the term usually refers to the owner or owners, it is nevertheless important to be 
aware of the distinction. Since the terminology is so incorporated in Norwegian terminolo-
gy and legislation, we have chosen to use the term Reder in accordance with the Maritime 
Code.
16
 When it is considered necessary to separate clearly between the terms Reder and 
shipowner, such as in MC chapter 10, the distinction will be highlighted.  
 
                                                 
 
11
  In French and German the corresponding terms are armateur and Reeder respectively, cf. 
 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset (2011) p. 145.  
12
  Brækhus (1954) p. 33.   
13
  Rederi is defined in the Ship Safety and Security Act §4, Ship Labour Act §2-3 and the Maritime 
 Labour Convention art. II no. 1j).   
14
  Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset (2011) p. 146. 
15
  Ibid p. 147. 
16
  See MarIus 393 (2010) preface.  
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis will, in section 2, present a general overview of how the State handles maritime 
oil pollution incidents. State intervention in acute marine pollution incidents is a part of the 
general system provided by the Pollution Act. Therefore, section 3 discusses the applicabil-
ity of the Pollution Act, while section 4 and 5 concern the duty of preparedness and the 
duty to take action against acute pollution. Section 6 addresses state intervention, including 
the competence to issue orders and immediately implement measures. In section 7 the the-
sis examines the State’s claim for reimbursement, which necessitates a study of overlap-
ping legislation; particularly the Maritime Code. Section 8 accounts for the rules on limita-
tion of liability and some selected issues related hereto. Finally, section 9 summarises some 
of the findings and provides some concluding remarks.                   
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2 State Services in Cases of Oil Pollution  
2.1 Introduction  
The subject of the thesis concerns state intervention and claim for reimbursement in cases 
of marine oil pollution. It is beneficial to first address some questions of a more general 
character, in order to form the factual backdrop on which the further processing of the topic 
is based. Thus, this section will give account for the main features of the Norwegian State’s 
maritime services and its aims, with particular emphasis on services provided in relation to 
oil pollution. The presentation will be illustrated by some examples from incidents that 
have taken place in Norwegian waters.     
 
2.2 The Norwegian Coastal Administration 
The Norwegian Coastal Administration is a national agency for coastal management, mari-
time safety and acute pollution preparedness. The overarching vision of the agency is to 
develop the Norwegian coast and maritime zones into the safest and cleanest waters in the 
world.
17
 The Coastal Administration consists of eight operative units, including five re-
gional units, the Shipping Company, the Centre for Emergency Preparedness and the head 
office, all of which provides an array of different services. One can divide these into three 
main categories, namely; traditional maritime services, maritime infrastructure and prepar-
edness against acute pollution.  
 
Relevant in this context is the third category, preparedness against acute pollution. The 
Coastal Administration has prepared extensive contingency plans that can be implemented 
in the event of acute pollution. The main purpose is to protect life, health, the environment 
and industry stakeholders. The plans comprise both measures aiming to prevent pollution 
from occurring and measures aiming to limit the extent of the pollution after an incident 
has occurred.  
                                                 
 
17
  KV Handlingsplan 2014-2023 p. 7. 
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The Centre for Emergency Preparedness is the unit that is responsible for national prepar-
edness against acute pollution and enjoys nation-wide administrative authority. If an acute 
pollution incident occurs, it is the responsibility of this department to ensure that the liable 
polluter and/or local municipality implement the necessary response measures.  
 
2.3 State Management of Oil Pollution Incidents 
Oil spill accidents generally cause significant environmental damage. However, the extent 
of the inflicted damage and its effect on different types of marine environment depends on 
several external factors. The type and amount of the escaped oil, circumstances regarding 
the sea, surface and weather – such as waves, tidal movement, temperature, winds and cur-
rents – have considerable influence on the magnitude of the accident. Next to living organ-
ism, plants and animals such as plankton, fish and seabirds, the shores are especially ex-
posed to the effects of oil spills. If the shoreline is exposed to oil pollution, the flora and 
fauna on the shore are also inherently vulnerable to the negative effects. 
 
In order to avoid damage to the marine environment and reduce the risk of acute pollution, 
the government’s main focus is to prevent accidents from arising as such. To achieve this 
goal, the State has adopted preventive marine safety measures. Establishing a functional 
maritime infrastructure, setting requirements to the vessel, crew and working conditions, 
and supervising that the requirements are actually being complied with are significant con-
tributors to safety at sea. Considerable attention and legislation regarding maritime envi-
ronment, health and safety (EHS) is therefore an important part of the Norwegian strategy. 
 
Even though the main focus is to prevent accidents from arising as such, it is unfortunately 
a well-known fact that accidents will continue to take place. If an accident occurs and oil 
spill is unavoidable, the focus turns to limiting and minimising the negative consequences 
of the incident. In order to deal with acute oil spill or a situation which may lead to an oil 
spill, the State has developed comprehensive emergency systems. These systems encom-
pass preparedness strategies against acute pollution with thorough plans as regards to the 
organisation, procedures and measures. 
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2.4 Procedure and Measures utilised in Norwegian Waters 
When incidents of acute oil pollution – or the threat of such pollution – are reported to the 
Coastal Administration, response personnel and equipment are mobilised immediately ac-
cording to predetermined routines and procedures.
18
 As a starting point, the procedure is 
based on extensive co-operation between governmental authorities, local authorities, pri-
vate parties and the responsible polluter and the insurer.
19
 Practically, it is the respective 
P&I insurer who often undertakes many of the duties of the polluter.
20
 As the insurer gen-
erally have to bear the expenses in the final round, he will often have a proactive approach 
to the operation.
21
 Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the insurance companies often 
feel side-lined by the Coastal Authorities.
22
   
 
The main strategy in the Norwegian emergency system is to combat acute oil pollution 
with the use of mechanical equipment as close as possible to the source of pollution.
23
 This 
strategy has proven effective where the oil spill originates from a specific point, for in-
stance in a petroleum blowout situation far away from the shoreline. However, experience 
gained from several international oil pollution accidents involving vessels has revealed 
that, as a starting point, it is difficult to remove more than 10-15 % of the oil spill close to 
the source of pollution.
24
 That is because vessel-sourced oil pollution necessitates more 
flexibility due to the nature of these accidents, including the types of damage to the vessels, 
the location, as well as the weather, winds and currents. Therefore, oil spills are first and 
                                                 
 
18
  St.meld. nr. 14 (2004-2005) p. 59. 
19
  Such as the Coast Guard, the Armed Forces, the Maritime Authority and the Directorate for Civil 
 Protection. 
20
  Gold (2006) p. 599 et seq.  
21
  For an overview of insurance matters in connection with pollution claims, see Williams (2013) p. 
 265 et seq.  
22
  According to conversation with representatives from the Swedish Club, Gothenburg 03.04.14. 
23
  St.meld. nr. 14 (2004-2005) p. 50. 
24
  Ibid p. 67. 
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foremost removed continuously where floating, but considerable quantities also evaporate, 
get mixed with water or are stranded.  
 
The Coastal Administration has established several different oil spill response depots along 
the coastline with necessary equipment. Oil booms and skimmers are the most important 
type of mechanical equipment. Oil skimmers are equipment which collects, cleans and 
transports oil from the surface to oil storage tanks placed on vessels or ashore.
25
 Oil booms 
are used to direct, gather and incarcerate oil that floats uncontrolled at sea.
26
  
 
The practical utilisation of oil booms and skimmers can be illustrated by the Rocknes- and 
Full City-accidents.
27
 The vessels, which were carrying significant amounts of oil, ran 
aground and caused major oil spills. The Coastal Administration intervened, and undertook 
the clean-up operations. Booms and skimmers were brought into action, and contributed to 
the recuperation of several tons of oil. However, substantial quantities were not successful-
ly recollected, thereby contaminating adjacent flora and fauna. The total estimated cost of 
these major accidents was 133 million and 256 million NOK respectively, the latter consti-
tuting the most expensive operation of its kind in Norwegian history.
28
 
 
Another important part of the preparedness plans is the use of emergency discharging 
equipment. Draining and discharging bunkers and/or oil carried in bulk, are effective 
measures which may prevent and limit oil spills. Other useful measures that are utilised are 
the services provided by tugboats. Tugboats are used to tow and direct the vessel, prevent-
ing it from running aground or towing it when already grounded. Emergency discharging 
and towing are regarded as very efficient measures. Under the specific circumstances, these 
                                                 
 
25
  Beredskapsrapporten p. 16. 
26
  Ibid p. 6. 
27
  See Rocknesrapporten and Havforskningsrapporten p. 6-10 and 15-25. 
28
  NOU 2013:8 p. 30. 
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measures will also quite often represent a relatively cheap method of tackling the oil spill 
situation.  
 
The accident involving the Icelandic trawler “Gudrun Gisladottir” provides a good illustra-
tion of the use of emergency discharge equipment and towing. The vessel ran aground and 
sank while it was being towed to a safe harbour. Eventually, it was decided to abandon the 
ship on the seabed and confine the operation to only draining the vessel of its oil. The dam-
aged vessel is presently still situated on the seabed, but is not considered a threat to the 
marine environment. 
 
Usually, the accidents require a combination of all the above mentioned measures. The 
Server-accident may serve as an illustration.
29
 The vessel ran aground and broke, resulting 
in considerable oil spill. A range of different measures were implemented; booms, skim-
mers, discharge and towage, but did not prevent oil pollution over extensive areas. The 
State initially set forth a claim of almost 200 million NOK, and the legal proceedings are 
still in progress.    
  
The Fjord Champion-accident is also of interest; the vessel caught on fire and eventually 
ran aground. The Coastal Administration intervened, initiating comprehensive oil contin-
gency procedures. Subsequently, the State claimed their expenses reimbursed by the 
Rederi. A peculiar observation is that no oil in fact escaped from the vessel. Nevertheless, a 
substantial claim was set forth.    
 
Finally, if considered expedient, dispersants may be used in the combat against oil pollu-
tion. Dispersants are used to accelerate the natural decomposition of oil. The advantage 
with dispersed oil is that it rather quickly is diluted and decomposed by microorganisms. 
The use of chemicals may be used both as a supplement and as an alternative, to mechani-
                                                 
 
29
  Havforskningsrapporten p. 10-14. 
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cal equipment, but must be applied relatively quickly to prospective.
30
 The Coastal Admin-
istration nevertheless uses dispersants with reluctance since some chemicals may be just as 
damaging as the oil, especially evidenced after the Torrey Canyon accident, and may also 
constitute pollution.
31
    
 
Compared to the international disasters involving tanker vessels, the accidents in Norwe-
gian waters appear as quite insignificant with regards to the amount of spilled oil. Never-
theless, as illustrated, the Coastal Administration has been required to initiate comprehen-
sive and demanding operations, which entail substantial resources both in relation to mate-
rial and personnel. The total costs are often of an enormous magnitude. Thus, considering 
the extensive costs, the harmful effects and the challenging efforts they require, the acci-
dents and the subsequent clean-up are an interesting study. Not surprisingly, questions re-
lating to cost allocation tend to cause disputes.  
  
                                                 
 
30
  Beredskapsrapporten p. 43. 
31
  FOR-2004-06-01-931 chapter 19.  
 15 
3 Pollution and the Applicability of the Pollution Act 
3.1 Introduction 
The present section will give account for the applicability of the Pollution Act, including its 
purpose, geographical and substantive scope. Furthermore, the general duty to avoid pollu-
tion will be addressed, before analysing the concepts acute pollution and risk of acute pol-
lution.    
 
3.2 Generally 
The purpose of the Pollution Act is stated explicitly in §1(1) and (2). The overarching ob-
jectives can be summarised as, firstly, to work against pollution, including both existing 
pollution and pollution that might occur in the future. This also comprises a desire of re-
ducing the amount of waste and seeking to promote better waste management. Secondly, it 
seeks to ensure a satisfactory environmental quality by limiting the damaging effects of 
pollution.  
 
The Pollution Act exempts pollution from individual means of transport, e.g. ships, from its 
area of applicability, and refers to the special regulation such as the Ship Safety and Securi-
ty Act and the Harbour Act, cf. §5(2). As a starting point, pollution deriving from the ship-
ping industry is therefore not regulated by the PA. However, according to §5(3) many of 
the central provisions are given application nevertheless, namely, §7(2) and (4), chapter 6 
and §§74-77. Thus, if a tanker vessel runs aground, the rules on acute pollution will accord-
ingly come into use.    
 
The Pollution Act applies to sources of pollution “within the realm”, cf. §3(2) no. 1. The 
wording refers to the areas of the Norwegian main-land and the territorial sea.
32
 Further-
more, it applies to “any threat of pollution within the realm”, cf. §3(2) no. 2. This phrase 
                                                 
 
32
  Territorial Sea Act §§1 and 2. 
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comprises pollution from vessels located within the territorial sea and vessels threatening to 
cause pollution in the territorial sea.
33
 Additionally, the Act is applicable on pollution from 
Norwegian vessels insofar as they are located in the Norwegian Economic Zone or located 
outside and threatening to cause pollution within the Norwegian Economic Zone, cf. §3(2) 
no. 3.
34
   
 
It should be noted that the Act does not apply to Svalbard
35
, and only to Jan Mayen and the Nor-
wegian dependencies to the extent decided by the King. These regulations will not be addressed in 
the following.  
 
The area of applicability has one important limitation, namely, that the Act is subject to 
“…any restrictions deriving from international law”, cf. §3. In this respect, the most practi-
cal implication is perhaps that foreign ships enjoy the right of innocent passage in the terri-
torial sea.
36
 However, it is questionable whether or not a ship is in innocent passage if it 
represents a threat of acute pollution. Some guidance is provided in the preparatory works 
to the Harbour Act:  
 
“To the extent a ship in the territorial sea represents a threat of acute pollution, 
over which the government can intervene on the basis of the Pollution Act §74, it 
has to be generally recognised that its passage is not innocent and the principle of 
innocent passage is consequently not an impediment for intervention.” 37 
    
Therefore, it must be presumed that the principle of innocent passage does not limit the 
applicability of the Pollution Act in relation to acute pollution. 
 
                                                 
 
33
  Wang (2005) p. 19. 
34
  See Maritime Code chapter 1 and the Economic Zone Act §1(2).     
35
  See the Svalbard Environmental Act. 
36
  “United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea” (UNCLOS) art. 17 and Territorial Sea Act §2(2). 
37
  Ot.prp.nr.75 (2007-2008) p. 81.  
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Moreover, the Pollution Act §74(5) provides a basis for Norwegian governmental interven-
tion on the high seas and the outer territorial waters. Of central importance in this relation 
is the “International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of oil 
Pollution Casualties 1969”, incorporated into Norwegian law by the Intervention Regula-
tion38, cf. §74(5).39      
 
3.3 The Substantive Scope  
3.3.1 Pollution as a legal term  
The term pollution is somewhat ambiguous as it may have various meanings depending on 
the circumstances. It is thus necessary to define the term in some detail, as the existence of 
pollution is a condition precedent for intervention and claiming reimbursement. In a legal 
perspective, the term is utilised in several different acts and regulations.
40
 The most im-
portant definition is nevertheless found in the Pollution Act §6, which also influences other 
parts of the legislation. 
 
The statutory definition of pollution pursuant to the Pollution Act is quite extensive. The 
provision provides a list with several different factors that might have a negative impact on 
the environment, cf. §6(1) no. 1-4. As far as maritime oil pollution is concerned, the rele-
vant alternative is §6(1) no. 1 which concerns “the introduction of solids, liquids or gases to 
air, water or ground” which “cause or may cause damage or nuisance to the environment”.  
 
That one or more of the listed factors must be introduced in the environment implies that 
the introduction to the environment must originate from human activity that comprises de-
liberate actions, omissions and mishaps. However, borderline cases may arise, especially 
                                                 
 
38
  FOR-1997-09-19-1061. 
39
  General questions of coastal state jurisdiction pertaining to international law will not be addressed, 
 see rather Aage Thor Falkanger (2010) and Birnie/Boyle/Redgwell (2009) chapter 7.   
40
  E.g. Svalbard Environmental Protection Act §3 a) and Ship Safety and Security Act §31.  
 18 
when the cause is a combination of both human activity and natural causes.
41
 When oil 
escapes from a ship and leaks out, it is clearly a liquid that is being introduced to the envi-
ronment originating from human activity.       
 
Furthermore, the introduction of the substance must “cause or may cause damage or nui-
sance to the environment” to constitute pollution. The phrase expresses a legal standard42, 
and its content is accordingly of a flexible nature.
43
 Furthermore, the phrase displays that it 
is the effects of the introduced substance that is decisive in the assessment.
44
 The formula-
tion is extensive, as all damage and nuisance must be taken into consideration, whether it 
affects people, animals or nature itself, and it does not make any difference whether the 
damages and nuisances materialise in the urban- or natural environment.
45
 Incidents such as 
personal injury, damage to property, pure economic loss and damage to nature are included 
in the term damage.
46
 The threshold for constituting nuisance is lower, and comprises inci-
dents which inflicts inconvenience, unpleasantness and reduced quality of life, which does 
not necessarily cause any physical or economic damage.
47
  
 
Consequently, the term pollution is defined broadly and only clearly insignificant damage 
or nuisance is not comprised by the definition.
48
 This applies a fortiori when the effects of 
the incident are quickly restored by natural processes.
49
 However, this lower threshold will 
not be actualised in the type of maritime casualties which this thesis focuses on.  
 
                                                 
 
41
  Compare Backer (2012) p. 313 and Bugge (1999) p. 215. 
42
  See Knoph (1939). 
43
  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 94. 
44
  Tyrén (1990) p. 36. 
45
  NUT 1977:1 p. 112. 
46
  Wang (2005) p. 25-26.  
47
  Bugge (1999) p. 225. 
48
  NUT 1977:1 p. 112 and Bugge (1999) p. 229-230. 
49
  Backer (2012) p. 314.  
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Additionally, it should be emphasised that the definition does not require that the damage 
or nuisance have materialised; it is sufficient that it “may cause” damage or nuisance. This 
wording, along with the statements made in the preparatory works, may be seen as a way of 
expressing the precautionary principle.
50
  
 
The term “environment” should also be interpreted extensively, as it comprises both the 
natural environment and man-made surroundings.
51
 It is decisive whether “…the environ-
ment is influenced so that it cannot be used in the same way as it used to, whether it is hu-
mans, animals or plants that is subject to damage, or it concerns damages on objects or re-
sources”.52 On this basis, it can be stated with certainty that for all practical purposes, ma-
rine oil pollution will be encompassed by the provision. 
 
3.3.2 Waste as a legal term 
As the name of the Act and its purpose implies, waste and pollution are treated as two dif-
ferent subjects. This is reflected in the Act by regulating issues concerning waste separately 
in chapter 5. Seeing that there are special rules applying to waste, it is of importance to 
make a distinction between the two terms.  
 
The term “waste” is statutorily defined in §27(1). The point of departure is the first sen-
tence, stating; “…discarded objects of personal property or substances”. The term “sub-
stances” is primarily meant to cover solid waste, but waste in a liquid state is to a large ex-
tent also included.
53
 Of particular interest to this thesis is the example of liquid waste pro-
vided in the preparatory works, stating that “paint waste and oil waste” is included.54 The 
                                                 
 
50
  NUT 1977:1 p. 112. 
51
  Ibid.  
52
  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 95. 
53
  Ibid p. 132. 
54
  Ibid.  
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term “discarded” means that the substance must be rejected by the possessor. Accordingly, 
an oil spill might qualify as both pollution and waste. The preparatory works does not elab-
orate upon this issue; guidance must therefore be sought in other sources. 
 
In this respect, the definition of waste pursuant to EU/EEA law is relevant, as it is consid-
ered to correspond with the term in Norwegian law.
55
 The starting point pursuant to 
EU/EEA law is directive 75/442/EØF (henceforth referred to as the Waste Directive), in-
cluded in the EEA agreement, which defines waste as “…any substance or object […] 
which the holder discards or intends or is required to discard”.56 The similarity to the Pollu-
tion Act §27 is obvious. Since the directive is relevant to the EEA agreement, cases from 
the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning the interpretation of the article are 
also important for the meaning pursuant to Norwegian law.  
 
The judgment in Case C-188/07 concerns compensation of damages in the aftermath of the 
marine casualty of the tanker vessel “Erika”. One question addressed was whether oil spill 
from a vessel could be regarded as waste pursuant to the Waste Directive.
57
 The Court con-
cluded: “…hydrocarbons accidentally spilled at sea following a shipwreck, mixed with 
water and sediment and drifting along the coast of a Member State until being washed up 
on that coast, constitute waste within the meaning of Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442, 
where they are no longer capable of being exploited or marketed without prior pro-
cessing”.58 As this case is relevant for the Norwegian interpretation of waste, the conclu-
sion must be that an oil spill can be regarded as waste also according to the PA, seeing that 
the spilled oil can rarely be exploited without further processing.     
 
                                                 
 
55
  Bugge (20014) notes 125 and 126. 
56
  Directive 75/442/EØF art. 1(a) and 2008/98/EF art. 3(1). Directive 75/442/EØF was codified and
 replaced by directive 2006/12/EF which again was replaced by Directive 2008/98/EF. 
57
  Case C-188/07 Commune de Mesquer v Total France SA and Total International Ltd., paragraph 49.    
58
  Ibid, paragraph 63. 
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Summing up, it is evident that an oil spill may be comprised by both the definition of pollu-
tion pursuant to §6 and the term waste pursuant to §27. Consequently, both set of rules 
might be applicable in an oil spill incident and the chosen definition may have some impli-
cations.  
 
A particular issue arising if one applies the rules concerning waste is a potential conflict between 
the Waste Directive and the Liability Convention; cf. case C-188/07. Both set of rules assume ex-
clusive applicability, but has conflicting regulations of the subjects of liability and limitation of li-
ability. However, such issues will not be pursued.  
 
It is nevertheless clear that administrative practices, case law and other legal customs apply 
the rules regarding pollution in oil spill incidents. The issue has not been problematised, 
and after all this seems to be the most natural interpretation of the Act. The thesis will 
therefore address the regulatory framework concerning oil as pollution.  
 
3.4 The General Prohibition against Pollution 
Norwegian environmental law is based on a principal distinction between lawful and un-
lawful pollution.
59
 Accordingly, the Pollution Act §7(1) imposes a general prohibition 
which states that “no person may possess, do, or initiate anything that may entail a risk of 
pollution unless this is lawful…”. Hence, both actions and omissions, including passive 
ownership and rights of disposition, which may entail a risk of pollution are comprised by 
the general prohibition.
60
 Incidents involving acute oil pollution – or the threat of such pol-
lution – must, with certain reservations, always be regarded as unlawful pollution accord-
ing to the provision. 
 
The Ship Safety and Security Act §31 also introduces a general prohibition against “pollu-
tion of the external environment by the discharge or dumping from ships, or by the incin-
                                                 
 
59
  Bugge (1999) p. 288. 
60
  Bugge (2014) note 29, Wang (2005) p. 28. 
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eration of harmful substances, or pollution in any other way in connection with the opera-
tion of the ship, unless otherwise decided by law or regulation laid down pursuant to 
law”.61 The general prohibition and associated exceptions are in line with the “International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships”.62 
 
In this respect, mention should be made of continuous pollution, which derives from the 
ordinary management and operation of the vessel.63 Typical examples are delivery of waste 
and cargo remnants and discharge of sewage and noxious substances. Continuous pollution 
is primarily regulated by the Ship Safety and Security Act, while acute pollution is – con-
trariwise – first and foremost regulated by the Pollution Act.64 As this thesis is focusing on 
accidents causing or threatening to cause oil spill, the thesis will neither address nor elabo-
rate upon issues concerning continuous pollution.  
 
3.5 Acute Pollution and Risk of Acute Pollution 
3.5.1 Introduction 
The Pollution Act makes use of two qualified terms concerning pollution, that is; acute 
pollution and risk of acute pollution. Seeing that these terms are important criteria in sever-
al provisions throughout the PA, they will be reviewed in the following.      
 
3.5.2 Acute pollution 
Acute pollution is statutory defined in §38 and subject to special regulation in chapter 6. 
The drafters considered it adequate to regulate acute pollution separately because of the 
                                                 
 
61
  See; FOR-2012-05-30-488 and FOR-2004-06-01-931. 
62
  MARPOL. 
63
  Hernes Pettersen/Bull (2010) p. 517.  
64
  Hernes Pettersen (2013) note (36).  
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distinct nature of this kind of pollution.
65
 The definition reads; “…significant pollution that 
occurs suddenly and that is not permitted in accordance with provisions set out in or issued 
pursuant to this Act.”  
 
The first condition requires that the pollution must be significant, and shall be based on a 
judicial assessment where the frequency of such accidents, its adverse effects and other 
consequences are important criteria.
66
 However, it is evident that the threshold must be set 
low, as the wording primarily seeks to exclude incidents of a trivial character.
67
   
 
The second condition prescribes that the pollution must occur suddenly, and implies that 
the incident must be somewhat unexpected and abrupt. The preparatory works mention 
“…oil spills, e.g. as a result of shipwreck […] and the release of chemicals and other harm-
ful substances due to an accident” as typical examples.68 All though the accident must oc-
cur suddenly, the cause of the accident may have developed gradually over time. In relation 
to a ship accident, possible causes may be ordinary wear and tear of the hull, machinery or 
other equipment.  
 
In view of the above, it is clear that a maritime accident involving an oil spill from a vessel 
will entail acute pollution pursuant to §38. Consequently, the rules on preparedness, the 
duty to take action and the rules on governmental intervention are applicable, cf. the PA 
chapter 6.   
 
                                                 
 
65
  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 150.  
66
  Ibid. 
67
  Ibid. 
68
  Ibid p. 57-58 and 150.  
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3.5.3 Risk of acute pollution 
Many central provisions in the Pollution Act do not require that acute pollution have mate-
rialised in order to be applicable; it is sufficient that there is a risk of acute pollution. This 
alternative is highly relevant for marine casualties, as it may be unclear whether oil has in 
fact escaped the vessel and constituted acute pollution.      
 
The term generally implies that action sometimes must be taken preventatively, which is in 
line with the precautionary principle.
69
 Contrary to acute pollution, the term risk of is not 
statutory defined. However, since the term is utilised throughout the PA, the preparatory 
works provide some guidance. 
 
The threshold for constituting a risk should not be set too high in practice, although totally 
insignificant risks must be disregarded.
70
 The assessment must be based on the objective 
probability that pollution will occur and the extent of the damage and nuisance that is 
feared to be inflicted if the pollution manifests itself.
71
 It is sufficient that there are reliable 
indications that pollution might occur.
72
 In this respect the preparatory works provide an 
example where a vessel sinks and there is uncertainty relating to the risk of oil escaping the 
vessel, and expresses that in such situations there will be a “particular suspicion” that pollu-
tion might occur.
73
 Reference can be made to the Fjord Champion-accident; where there 
was a clear risk of acute pollution because the vessel was fairly old, constructed on a single 
hull and contained considerable amounts of oil, grounded in an environmentally vulnerable 
area.     
 
                                                 
 
69
  Bugge (2014) note 29. 
70
  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 96 and NOU 1977:11 p. 21.  
71
  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 96.  
72
  Bugge (2014) note 29. 
73
  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 96.  
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Moreover, it must be clear that the “risk of” criterion is of a dynamic nature, in the sense 
that the assessment must be performed continuously, considering how the risk presents 
itself at any given time. In a maritime casualty, the risk may therefore be assessed different-
ly depending on shifting circumstances such as the wind, waves and currents.    
  
 26 
4 Preparedness against Acute Pollution 
4.1 Introduction 
An important feature of the Pollution Act is the duty to maintain preparedness against acute 
pollution. Although the duty of preparedness relates to the preventive stages of an incident, 
a presentation is necessary in order to get a complete understanding of state intervention in 
acute oil pollution incidents.   
 
The preparedness is primarily premeditated systems that provide control mechanisms, plans 
for how the concrete pollution should be handled and guidelines regarding notification 
when acute situations occur.
74
 More precisely, the plans describe and put forward necessary 
tasks, distribute responsibility between different parties and key players, give an account of 
the equipment which should be available on short notice, including how the equipment 
ought to be used and provide information and access to personnel with requisite knowledge 
and training.
75
 
 
The Norwegian emergency system and preparedness against acute marine pollution in-
volves several participants, both public and private. In general, the emergency preparedness 
is organised in three levels; private-, municipal- and governmental preparedness. The dif-
ferent parties are delegated different duties and responsibilities, primarily based on the ex-
tent and seriousness of the situation. 
 
4.2 Private Preparedness 
The point of departure in Norwegian environmental law is that any person engaged in an 
activity that may result in acute pollution shall provide a necessary emergency response 
system to prevent, detect, stop, remove and limit the impact of the pollution, cf. the Pollu-
                                                 
 
74
  Bugge (1999) p. 358. 
75
  Ibid. 
 27 
tion Act §40(1) first sentence. The duty of preparedness against acute pollution is a specifi-
cation and concretisation of the general prohibition against pollution in §7(1).
76
 
 
The Ship Safety and Security Act imposes a general duty on each vessel to maintain a “necessary 
emergency response system, including an emergency preparedness plan, in order to prevent, or 
[…] limit the effects of pollution of the external environment from the ship”, cf. §34. The main dif-
ference between this provision and the Pollution Act §40, is that the latter specifically addresses 
acute pollution.
77
 
 
The private preparedness shall be in a reasonable proportion to the probability of acute pol-
lution and the extent of the damage and nuisance that may arise, cf. §40(1) second sen-
tence. One must concretely estimate the probability of an accident – together with the ex-
tent of potential damages – against the total costs of preparedness.78 
 
The pollution control authority may require that contingency plans shall be submitted for approval 
for any activity that may result in acute pollution, cf. §41. The content depends on the concrete en-
terprise.
79
 In the shipping industry, contingency plans are drawn up both for each individual vessel 
and the Rederi in general. 
 
Even though the general rules regarding private preparedness pursuant to the Pollution Act 
are indisputably applicable to the shipping industry, the nature of the industry makes them 
difficult to completely maintain and enforce. Incidents involving oil pollution are often 
very difficult to predict, especially when it comes to analysing the development and the 
damages that might arise. Demanding shipowners and vessels to possess equipment and 
personnel that can handle massive accidents is unpractical and not economically sustaina-
                                                 
 
76
  Bugge (2014) note 174. 
77
  Hernes Pettersen (2013) note 36. 
78
  Bugge (1999) p. 359. 
79
  Wang (2005) p. 90. 
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ble. The complexity of acute oil pollution situations implies that co-operation
80
 and assis-
tance by the Coastal Administration are absolutely necessary in practice.
81
 
 
4.3 Public Preparedness 
4.3.1 Municipal Preparedness 
Local governments and municipalities shall provide for necessary emergency response sys-
tems to deal with “minor incidents of acute pollution” that may occur or cause damage 
within the municipality, cf. the Pollution Act §43(1).   
 
The regulations are first and foremost designed to handle pollution onshore or near the 
coastline. Municipalities have neither the necessary equipment nor the expertise to handle 
more significant cases of acute oil pollution at sea. Municipal preparedness is therefore in 
practice limited to handle small oil spills within the port area.
82
 
 
4.3.2 Governmental Preparedness 
The State shall provide the necessary emergency response system to deal with “major inci-
dents of acute pollution” that are not covered by the municipal emergency response sys-
tems or by the private emergency response system, cf. the PA §43(2). The Coastal Admin-
istration is delegated the main duty and responsibility to carry out, operate and organise a 
                                                 
 
80
  The Norwegian Shipowners’ Association assists all Norwegian shipowners, inter alia through the 
 Contingency Planning Secretariat.  
81
  The Coastal Administration is delegated authority to order private parties and persons engaged in  
 activities that may result in acute pollution to co-operate on the preparedness against pollution, cf. 
 the Pollution Act §42(1). Such co-operation saves costs for the parties and provides a more efficient 
 emergency response system; cf. Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 153. 
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  Wang (2005) p. 91. 
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high functioning preparedness at the governmental level.
83
 In practice, this necessitates co-
operation with several other public authorities and agencies. 
 
Governmental preparedness at sea is first and foremost aiming to manage significant ma-
rine casualties and emissions on the continental shelf.
84
 Nevertheless, seeing that oil spills 
originating from vessels often are equally complex and difficult to handle for the parties 
involved, the Coastal Administration is the key player in this respect also.  
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  FOR-2002-12-20-1912. 
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  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 154. 
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5 The Duty to Take Action against Acute Oil Pollution 
5.1 Introduction 
While the duty of preparedness is related to the preventive stages of combating oil pollu-
tion, the duty to take action relates to the concrete situation where acute pollution has oc-
curred or threatens to occur. Although fundamentally different, the two duties are closely 
connected.  
 
This section covers the duty to take action, including the substantive scope of the duty and 
the question of which subjects the duty rest upon. Although this thesis primarily concerns 
the State’s right to intervene and claim reimbursement, it is necessary to examine these 
issues. That is, because these questions are interrelated and display the context in which the 
issues concerning intervention arise.     
 
5.2 The Responsible Person’s Duty to Take Action against Pollution 
5.2.1 Generally  
The Pollution Act §46(1) prescribes; “[i]n the event of acute pollution or a risk of acute 
pollution, the person responsible shall in accordance with section 7 initiate measures to 
avoid or limit damage and nuisance”. To understand the content of this duty, it is necessary 
to assess the criteria provided by the provision in further detail. The terms acute pollution 
and risk of acute pollution refer to the moment in time at which the duty to take action aris-
es. The terms are accounted for above and do not necessitate any further elaboration. How-
ever, the term person responsible will be thoroughly examined. Thereafter, it will be as-
sessed what further criteria that are prescribed by §7.   
 
The Ship Safety and Security Act implies, to a large extent, a corresponding duty to take action 
against pollution. According to §37(1) a), the “master” of the ship shall ensure “that reasonable 
measures are taken in order to prevent such pollution or limit the effects of it”. Illustrative 
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measures are the initiation of emergency response systems and operating available equipment and 
personnel in order to avoid or reduce the extent of pollution.
85
 
 
5.2.2  The person responsible 
Pursuant to §46(1), the phrase “the person responsible” refers to the entity, legal person or 
individual who is the subject on whom the duty to take action rests. The term in §46 should 
be interpreted in the same way as in §7.
86
     
 
The person responsible is, as a starting point, the person from whom the pollution origi-
nates. That is, the person who possess, does, or initiates activities that may cause pollu-
tion.
87
 This will usually be the owner of the object from which the pollution derives, but 
also persons having disposal of the object or other holders of legal rights in the object 
might be regarded as the person responsible under the circumstances.
88
 There is no re-
quirement that the person responsible has demonstrated culpable conduct, the occurrence 
may simply be a result of an unfortunate mishap.
89
 Additionally, it will be of significance 
to examine which person has the economic interest in the activity that is posing the pollu-
tive threat.
90
 Which person that will benefit from an eventual clean-up operation will also 
be of significance, as this person presumably has a close connection to the activity.
91
    
 
Even though it is possible to adopt certain guiding criteria for the assessment of which par-
ty represents the person responsible, it is nevertheless evident that the term remains some-
what ambiguous. Applied to maritime affairs, the term may refer to e.g. the Reder, owner, 
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  Hernes Pettersen/Bull (2010) p. 566-567, Ot.prp.nr.87 (2005-2006) p. 123. 
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  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 157. 
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  Cf.  Rt-2012-944 paragraph (57). 
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  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 97. 
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  NOU 1977:11 p. 23.  
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charterer, carrier, cargo owner or master. Even so, the interpretation of the term implies 
that in most cases it is the Reder who will be regarded as the person responsible.
92
 The 
Reder is usually the owner of the ship, and the person from whom the pollution originates. 
The legal owner of the ship will ordinarily be identified through the ship registry of the flag 
state
93
 and the IMO identification number.
94
 However, the Reder and the owner may not 
always be the same legal entity. The capacity as Reder may be transferred to other parties, 
e.g. by way of enforcement or through a contract of affreightment.  
 
Most noticeable in this respect are the so-called demise or bareboat charter parties. In such 
contracts, it is the charterer that for all practical purposes controls the vessel and has the 
economic interest in the specific activity. The bareboat charterer equips, crews and trades 
the vessel for his own account, and thereby essentially is the Reder.
95
 Therefore, the char-
terer is considered to be the person responsible in these circumstances.   
 
Moreover, it is possible that the person responsible will vary depending on the measure in 
question and there may be several responsible persons depending on the situation. The pre-
paratory works provides an example; if the driver of a vehicle carrying dangerous cargo 
suffers an accident, he will be the person who in the first instance has a duty to take ac-
tion.
96
  
 
If this approach is applied to a maritime situation, the consequence is that the master often 
will be the person responsible for initiating measures immediately as the accident occurs. 
Typical measures that will be required are requisitioning assistance from tugboats or other 
                                                 
 
92
  For a presentation of the traditional Reder term, see Brækhus (1954) p. 33 et seq.  
93
  In Norway, the ship registers are the Norwegian Ordinary Register (NOR) and Norwegian Interna-
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vessels and initiating repairs. Case law has proven that in such situations, the master may 
be considered the person responsible.
97
 Additionally, a duty is imposed on the master pur-
suant to the Maritime Code §135, which gives him or her an independent duty to provide 
for necessary measures in situations of distress. Finally, it should be mentioned that if the 
master does not fulfil the duty to take action, the consequence may be that he is subject to 
penal sanctions, and the company may be subject to criminal proceedings and incur a cor-
porate penalty.
98
     
 
The Reder will typically be responsible for acquiring further assistance for more compre-
hensive measures. Although it happens that the Reder is an individual owning a vessel di-
rectly as a sole proprietor, it is more customary to organise the shipping enterprise as a 
partnership
99
, limited partnership
100
, limited liability company or corporation
101
. If the 
choice of organisational structure is that of a company or corporation, the main rule is that 
the entity is an independent legal person. Consequently, it is the company, and not the 
owners, i.e. private shareholders or a parent company, which is the subject of responsibil-
ity. This principle rule does, however, seemingly have an important exception recently es-
tablished in the Hempel-case.
102
 The case involved the subject of responsibility pursuant to 
the Pollution Act §51; whether a parent company could be held responsible when its sub-
sidiary was in possession of something that could cause pollution. It should nevertheless be 
considered as guiding also in relation to §7, as the Supreme Court stated that the preparato-
ry works of §7 has “particular interest” when interpreting §51.103 The Supreme Court’s 
conclusion was that the parent company could be regarded as the subject of responsibility. 
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  See Rt-1992-1578 (Arisan).  
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This decision implies that a parental company can be considered the person responsible 
also pursuant to §7. Further details of this issue will not be elaborated; the present thesis is 
confined to highlighting the matter.
104
 Regardless, it will depend on a concrete assessment, 
where the parental company’s degree of control and economic interest in the subsidiary, as 
well as efficiency considerations, will be the guiding criteria.   
 
Another interesting question is if other parties with a connection to the vessel can be con-
sidered the person responsible. A practical issue is when a ship runs aground, becomes a 
total loss and it is not possible to direct a claim against the Reder. Is it possible that a hull 
insurer, P&I insurer or mortgagee can be regarded as the person responsible? As a starting 
point this must be answered in the negative. For the hull insurer, these issues are regulated 
in the “Nordic Marine Insurance Plan 2013” (NMIP). When paying compensation for dam-
age or total loss, the insurer is subrogated to the assured’s rights and gets title to the wreck, 
cf. §5-19(1) and (2). The insurer may, however, waive these rights and thereby be protected 
against the burdens that may be associated with owning the wreck.
105
 Furthermore, if the 
insurer takes possession of the wreck, and subsequently becomes liable for the costs of its 
removal, the assured shall reimburse him, cf. §5-20(1). This liability will finally be incum-
bent on the P&I insurer.
106
 However, the hull insurer cannot claim reimbursement for lia-
bility incurred by a new casualty occurring after the ownership has been transferred to him. 
Thus, in such a situation the hull insurer may be considered the person responsible, and 
should therefore consider obtaining a P&I insurance for this risk.    
 
The John R-accident displays a similar situation. After the vessel grounded, a company 
bought the wreck. Thereafter, the State intervened and claimed reimbursement from both 
the original Rederi and the new owner, while the Reder submitted that only the new owner 
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was liable. The question was not tested since the parties reached a settlement, but the case 
is nevertheless illustrative.     
 
5.2.3 The substantive scope of the duty 
The next issue that will be addressed is the content of the duty, and the question is therefore 
what measures have to be initiated to limit damage and nuisance “in accordance with sec-
tion 7”, cf. §46(1). The reference to §7 primarily aims at the second paragraph. 
 
The provision in §7(2) expresses the purpose of the measures that the person responsible is 
obliged to implement. The person responsible shall “ensure” that measures are taken in 
order to “prevent” pollution from occurring. For instance, if a ship suffers technical mal-
functions it will be necessary to provide for repairs to ensure that pollution is prevented. 
Other incidents where preventive measures must be implemented are in cases of grounding 
and collision, which represents the most common causes of acute pollution from vessels, as 
well as fault in navigation or machinery.
107
  
 
According to the second sentence, the person responsible shall take steps to “stop or re-
move the pollution or limit its effects”. Thus, the provision concerns measures that should 
be carried out if pollution has already occurred. All unwanted effects of pollution are en-
compassed; both direct physical and consequential effects on nature itself, as well as mate-
rial and economic effects on human health or welfare.
108
  
 
With respect to case law, the question of whether the person responsible has performed his 
duty to implement measures arises most frequently in connection with criminal proceed-
ings.
109
 The Full City-case is illustrative; the master of a vessel was convicted of breaching 
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the duty to notify the authorities.110 The result seems somewhat peculiar, considering that 
the authorities were already aware of the fact that the vessel was in distress. Reference can 
also be made to the Arisan-case, where the master rejected an offer regarding assistance 
from tugboats, despite the fact that such assistance was necessary as the ship wrecked and 
caused a considerable oil spill.
111
 
 
The duty to immediately notify authorities in the event of acute pollution – or the threat of such 
pollution – is a concrete manifestation of the duty to take action, cf. the Pollution Act §39 and the 
Ship Safety and Security Act §37.112 The notification shall contain information of the incident and 
give an account of what measures which are or will be initiated in order to prevent or minimise the 
effects.113  
 
Seemingly, the Pollution Act §7(2) separates between measures to prevent pollution from 
occurring, cf. first sentence, and measures implemented to stop, remove or limit the effects 
after pollution has occurred, cf. second sentence. In this context the Fjord Champion-case 
is of considerable interest; a vessel grounded and extensive measures was implemented, 
even though no oil escaped the vessel.
114
 The Rederi submitted that the provision implies 
such a distinction, stating that the duty to implement measures to stop, remove or limit the 
effects of pollution did not arise before pollution had actually taken place, even when the 
threat of pollution was acute. The Interlocutory Appeals Committee of the Supreme Court 
agreed with the Court of Appeal and reiterated that the duty to take action pursuant to §7(2) 
has to be read in conjunction with the general prohibition in §7(1) against possessing some-
thing that may cause pollution. Owning a wrecked ship that risked spilling oil was consid-
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ered in defiance with the Act, and the Reder was therefore obliged to implement measures. 
The Committee furthermore reiterated that the submitted interpretation would result in an 
artificial distinction that would be contrary to the purpose of the Act
 
.       
 
The third sentence in §7(2) prescribes that the person responsible must take steps to “miti-
gate”115 any damage or nuisance resulting from the pollution or from measures to counter-
act it.
116
 The aim is primarily to encompass reasonable measures to restore the natural envi-
ronment, or other damage or nuisance, such as re-introducing affected animals or fish and 
refilling of sand on beaches which has been contaminated by oil.
117
 Another practical 
measure that has been carried out following several oil accidents is cleaning of sea birds.
118
 
However, the duty to mitigate also includes damage and nuisance, which do not relate 
strictly to the natural environment, for instance quay structures and buildings.
119
  
 
The fourth sentence of §7(2) provides that the duty to take action against pollution applies 
to measures that are in “reasonable proportion” to the damage and nuisance to be avoided. 
The requirement of a reasonable proportionality between the measures and the damage and 
nuisance was adopted to limit the independent duty to take action.
120
 Consequently, the 
higher probability of damage or nuisance, the more extensive measures must be imple-
mented. Additionally, only measures that appear as necessary after a concrete assessment at 
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the time are comprised by the duty.
121
 The assessment must as a starting point be based on 
objective criteria, but also certain subjective criteria, such as the economic impact on the 
person responsible may under the circumstances be relevant.
122
     
 
Summing up, it is evident that the responsible person’s duty to take action pursuant to 
§7(2) is quite extensive. However, the system provided by the Pollution Act does not al-
ways seem to fit with the reality of the shipping industry. If oil pollution has materialised, 
the shipping companies will rarely have sufficient available resources to tackle the situa-
tion. It is not practically feasible that every ship is equipped with such comprehensive gear. 
In many situations, it is the respective insurance companies that may be able to procure the 
necessary clean-up services. But even the insurers will frequently fall short, as the Coastal 
Administration often is the only party that possess the available resources. The practical 
reality is that the Reder may only be able to fulfil his duty in the phase where it is a risk of 
pollution. When oil has escaped from the vessel, the system does not appear adequate to 
regulate oil spill incidents.   
       
5.3 The Public Duty to Take Action against Acute Oil Pollution 
The public duty to take action against acute oil pollution is subsidiary and a supplement to 
the responsible person’s duty to take action.123 However, as the person responsible often is 
unable to handle acute oil pollution alone, the public duty to take action is highly practical. 
 
The public duty to take action against acute pollution involves both local and central au-
thorities. The starting point is that the local municipalities have an unconditional duty to 
take action in cases of acute pollution within the municipality, while the government – if 
considered necessary – has the competence to take over, co-ordinate and run the operations. 
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If the person responsible “does not take adequate measures”, the “municipality concerned” 
shall “take steps to deal with the accident”, cf. the Pollution Act §46(2) first sentence. The 
municipal duty to take action applies to every event of acute pollution irrespective of size 
or if the situation is comprised by the municipal preparedness pursuant to §43. The under-
lying reason for why the person responsible has not taken adequate measures is irrelevant. 
Furthermore, an important part of the duty is to notify the Coastal Administration, so the 
State can assess whether it wants to assume command of the operation.    
 
The duty to take action against acute pollution is imposed on the municipality concerned. 
In situations where oil pollution crosses municipal borders, both the municipality where the 
incident takes place and the municipality where the effects are manifested are regarded as 
the “municipality concerned”.124 Reference can be made to the Server-accident where oil 
was discovered in eight different municipalities.  
 
In the event of “major incidents” involving acute pollution or a risk of acute pollution, the 
Coastal Administration “may” wholly or partly “assume command of efforts” to deal with 
the accident, cf. §46(3). In contrast to the municipal duty to take action, the government 
may choose to assume command over the operation.
125
 Whether or not an event is regarded 
as a major incident must be determined concretely. The Coastal Administration is, accord-
ing to regulations, given the authority to evaluate situations and declare governmental in-
tervention pursuant to §46.
126
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6 State Intervention 
6.1 Introduction 
If a ship has been involved in an accident that has caused or threatens to cause oil pollu-
tion, the government may, as displayed in subsection 5.3, choose to intervene in the follow-
ing operation. The next issue that arises is how this competence can be utilised. Hence, the 
topic of the present section is the legal basis for the State’s ability to intervene and to what 
extent intervention is lawful. 
   
The existence of an applicable legal basis is a condition precedent for state intervention 
according to the principle of legality.
127
 How strict the requirement of authority in law 
should be interpreted must be assessed concretely in each situation, taking all interpretative 
factors into consideration.
128
 Environmental law is an area where the motives behind the 
public regulations are generally considered to be particularly weighty.
129
 Additionally, the 
Constitution §110b provides an incentive not to adopt a strict interpretation on this area of 
law. Thus, there is no strict requirement to obtain an especially clear basis for intervention 
in the area of environmental law.
130
  
 
State intervention in cases of acute oil pollution mainly manifests itself through the Coastal 
Administration’s competence to issue orders, which will be addressed in subsection 6.2 and 
the Costal Administration’s competence to immediately implement measures, which will 
be processed in subsection 6.3. The presence of a legal basis for such intervention is not a 
point of controversy. The further qualitative conditions and how far this competence ex-
tends are, however, not as clear-cut. This has given rise to disputes in practice, where the 
responsible person often questions whether the intervention is too intrusive. Clarification of 
                                                 
 
127
  Graver (2007) p. 71, cf. Eckhoff/Smith (2006) p. 327.  
128
  Rt-1995-530 (Fjordlaks) p. 537. 
129
  Graver (2007) p. 77. 
130
  Backer (2012) p. 139.  
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these issues is important, as the intervention forms the framework that is determining for 
the reimbursement claim.        
 
State intervention in cases of oil pollution raises several questions pertaining to general administra-
tive law.131 Issued orders and measures implemented by the Costal Administration are, as a starting 
point, individual administrative decisions and consequently subject to various requirements set 
forth in the Public Administration Act, cf. the Pollution Act §85.132 However, such issues will not 
be pursued.  
 
6.2 Public Authorities Competence to Order the Responsible Party to 
Implement Measures 
6.2.1 Introduction 
The Pollution Act sets forth a general prohibition against pollution, as well as a duty for the 
responsible person to take action to prevent pollution from occurring or minimise pollution 
that has already occurred, cf. §7(1) and (2). However, these provisions alone do not form a 
satisfactory guarantee that sufficient procedures are implemented when an accident takes 
place. Occasionally, the responsible party does indeed not provide for necessary measures, 
either because he is unwilling or unable. This is the rationale behind the rule in §7(4), 
which gives the public authorities the competence to order the responsible person to im-
plement definite measures. It is important to bear in mind that the Reder is still responsible 
for the clean-up operation, even though the public authorities interfere.  
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6.2.2 The content of the competence 
It is stated in §7(4) that “[t]he pollution control authority may order the person responsible 
to implement measures pursuant to the second paragraph, first to third sentences, within a 
specified time limit”.  
 
The pollution control authority is defined in §81(1) and gives direction as to which public 
agency is delegated authority within the State hierarchy. The governmental body that en-
joys competence varies depending on the subject of regulation.
133
 With respect to acute 
pollution, the authority has been delegated to the Coastal Administration, which conse-
quently is entitled to issue orders concerning implementation of measures pursuant to 
§§7(4), cf. 81(2).
134
 
 
The main issue is what kind of measures the Coastal Administration can order the respon-
sible person to implement. The provision refers to the measures listed in the second para-
graph first to third sentences; hence, it refers to the responsible person’s duty to take action. 
This implies that the measures that can be imposed are limited to those that can “prevent” 
pollution from occurring, and if pollution has already occurred the measures must aim to 
“stop”, “remove” or “limit” the effects of pollution, cf. first and second sentence. Addition-
ally, the authorities can order the responsible party to take “steps to mitigate any damage or 
nuisance”, cf. third sentence. Insofar as the measures ordered by the Government is ade-
quate with respect to reaching one or more of these listed purposes, the responsible person 
will be obliged to comply with the order.  
 
6.2.3 Test of reasonableness – a substantive limitation? 
According to §7(2) fourth sentence, the duty to take action is limited to measures that are in 
a “…reasonable proportion to the damage and nuisance to be avoided”. At first glance it 
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therefore seems as though only the measures that are regarded as reasonable can be or-
dered implemented by the Coastal Administration. However, the competence to issue or-
ders pursuant to §7(4) only refer to the first three sentences. Consequently, the standard of 
reasonableness provided by the fourth sentence does not apply according to the wording. 
As a result, the Coastal Administration enjoys considerably wide authority and discretion 
when deciding which measures to impose under the specific circumstances.  
 
That the State’s competence to give orders is not limited by the criterion reasonable may 
be surprising. It is nevertheless manifestly a fact that the exclusion of this limitation was 
deliberate by the drafters;
135
 
 
“If the pollution control authority gives an order pursuant to the last paragraph, it 
is the discretion of the pollution control authority that is decisive when consider-
ing which measures that should be implemented, and this discretion can, as a start-
ing point, not be reviewed by the judiciary. In order to clarify this, §7 fourth para-
graph only refer to sentences two to three in the second paragraph, and according-
ly not to the fourth sentence.”136      
 
Therefore, there are seemingly few limitations on the Coastal Administration competence 
to order the responsible person to carry out measures. This is especially noticeable when 
considering that the courts are predominantly prevented from reviewing the discretion ex-
erted; so-called “free administrative discretion”.137 However, the consequences of exclud-
ing the criterion relating to reasonableness from §7(4) are not immediately clear. That is, 
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because the preparatory works provide some additional statements which makes it ques-
tionable whether the limitation was meant to apply nevertheless. Reference can be made to 
the proposition, which states that: 
 
“The responsible person can only be ordered to implement measures that are rea-
sonable according to the concrete circumstances. In the assessment of reasonable-
ness one may consider to what extent the person responsible is to blame for the 
pollution or the threat of pollution.” (Our underlining).138  
 
An additional argument from the preparatory works in support of applying a substantive 
limitation of reasonableness may be put forward. That is, the statement saying that the 
changes made to §7(2)-(4) in the recommendations submitted in NOU 1977:11 were of a 
“minor” character.139 This might imply that the intention was not to make any substantive 
amendments when leaving out the reference to the reasonable criterion. The changes were 
therefore presumably of an editorial nature, and the criterion may consequently still apply. 
 
Thus, if read in conjunction, the preparatory works could be interpreted as expressing that 
the orders issued pursuant to §7(4) should be subject to a concrete assessment of reasona-
bleness.   
    
On the other hand, it could obviously be argued that the provision itself does not adopt the 
limitation of reasonableness in its wording and that this was intended by the drafters. This 
view is supported in the literature. Wang states that a direct order is “…presumed to reach a 
bit further than the independent duty to take action”.140 Bugge is apparently of the same 
opinion, as he states that the provision does “…not contain any material boundaries for the 
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administrative decisions”.141 Additionally, Falkanger emphasises that the pollution control 
authority can order the person responsible to take measures “…without being bound by the 
[…] limitation”.142 He nevertheless states in continuation that; “…it is reason to believe 
that the pollution control authority will use the competence pursuant to fourth paragraph 
with caution, so that the limitation of reasonableness will apply in practice”. 
 
Hence, the general perception in legal theory seems to be that there is no substantive limita-
tion of reasonableness, and that the statements in the preparatory works, which immediate-
ly might indicate otherwise, should be interpreted as referring to the doctrine of abuse of 
discretionary power pursuant to administrative law.
143
 This view is furthermore supported 
by the Legislation Department, which in a Statement of Interpretation adhere to the argu-
ments set forth by Bugge.
144
  
 
With respect to case law, there are, to our knowledge, not any Norwegian cases providing any fur-
ther clarification of this matter.
145
 There are, however, two Swedish judgments that address the le-
gality of the orders given by the pollution control authorities.
146
 Both of the cases concern oil pol-
lution and provide comparative illustration, but are not directly comparable with Norwegian law. 
In the cases of Feederchief and Opus, the authorities ordered compulsory salvage of a grounded 
and a sunken vessel, to which the shipowners objected.
147
 The central question was whether the or-
ders were “warranted and reasonable”. After a concrete assessment, the Court of Appeal decided in 
favour of the Authorities in the first case and against in the latter.  
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It should be mentioned that Bugge recently seems to have nuanced his point of view to 
some extent, as he states that the practical differences will not be significant and that the 
issued orders primarily may concretise and clarify the duty to take action, not extend it.
148
 
This approach is in line with Backer, who states that the duty pursuant to §7(2) can be 
“…concretised by decisions from the pollution control authority in accordance with §7 
fourth paragraph”.149 
   
Summing up, it is nevertheless evident that statements in the preparatory works, in the legal 
literature and in the Interpretation Statement from the Legal Department provide a basis for 
assuming that there is no substantive criterion prescribing that the competence of the 
Coastal Administration is limited to ordering measures that are reasonable. Consequently, 
it seems the limits on the competence to impose orders pursuant to §7(4) go further than the 
responsible person’s independent duty to take action pursuant to §7(2). The outer border, 
within which the Coastal Administration must operate, is represented by the doctrine of 
abuse of discretionary power. In practice, there is therefore reason to believe that the con-
sequences of the absence of a substantive criterion are not that significant. In other words, 
it is because the doctrine of abuse of discretionary power prescribes that administrative 
decisions must not be grossly unreasonable. This involves a concrete assessment. Interven-
tion that is unnecessary or too extensive and comprehensive is, as a starting point, grossly 
unreasonable.
150
 Clearly, the Coastal Administration enjoys quite substantial authority 
when ordering which measures the person responsible has to implement. It will nearly only 
be arbitrary and clearly irrelevant measures that will not be comprised by the competence; 
the authorities may not order the polluter to initiate measures that are not connected to the 
pollution whatsoever.  
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6.3 Immediate Implementation of Measures by Public Authorities 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The Pollution Act §74 provides a legal basis for the Coastal Administration to arrange and 
implement measures immediately in cases of acute oil pollution. The provision is applica-
ble in three different situations; (i) if the person responsible does not carry out orders issued 
by the authorities, (ii) if issuing orders may cause a risk of delay and (iii) if it is uncertain 
who the person responsible is. The provision is scarce when addressing the scope and de-
fining the limits of lawful implementation of measures. The three different situations must, 
as a starting point, be interpreted and treated separately.
151
 
 
The Pollution Act §74 does not put any restrictions on authorities’ competence to take action 
against pollution pursuant to other legal bases.
152
 Negotiorum gestio, the principle of necessity and 
the right of self-defence provide such legal alternatives. The Coastal Administration is pursuant to 
the Harbour Act delegated authority to intervene in various situations, but §38(7) and the principle 
of lex specialis imply that the PA takes precedence in cases of acute pollution.
153
  
 
The following subsection will present the Costal Administration’s competence to immedi-
ately implement measures in cases of acute oil pollution. 
 
6.3.2 Issued orders are not carried out by the person responsible 
If the Coastal Administration has “issued orders” pursuant to §7(4) and these are “not car-
ried out by the person responsible”, the Coastal Administration “may arrange for the 
measures to be implemented” in cases of oil pollution, cf. §74(1).154 
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Whether or not the issued orders are carried out by the person responsible depends on a 
concrete interpretation of the issued orders held up against the actions taken by the person 
responsible. The provision does not make a distinction between situations where the person 
responsible attempts, but fails to carry out the orders and situations where the person re-
sponsible does not take any actions whatsoever. Subjective circumstances concerning the 
reason why the person responsible failed to follow the orders are of no interest. The Fjord 
Champion-case, in which the Coastal Administration intervened, partly because the person 
responsible failed to carry out the issued orders is illustrative. 
 
The Pollution Act §74(1) does not require the Coastal Administration to perform and carry 
out measures themselves. The wording “may arrange for the measures to be implemented” 
is used in order to allow the State to engage and hire private parties to implement measures 
if that is the most appropriate.
155
 However, the provision does not provide statutory authori-
ty for public authorities to impose orders on private parties other than the person responsi-
ble.
156
 It is therefore not possible for the Coastal Administration to demand a master on a 
nearby vessel – which has nothing to do with the incident – to take action pursuant to 
§74(1).
157
  
 
6.3.3 Issuing orders may result in a delay 
The Coastal Administration may arrange for measures to be implemented immediately in 
cases of oil pollution if “issuing orders may result in a risk of delay”, cf. §74(2).  
 
The provision provides the authorities with the competence to initiate measures that are 
needed with great urgency without issuing any orders in advance. The objective is to be 
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able to take action against pollution as early as possible. Whether or not there is a risk of 
delay must be assessed concretely in each individual situation. Why there is a risk of delay 
is irrelevant. 
 
RG-2012-1495 provides some guidance on how the provision should be interpreted.
158
 It was eval-
uated concretely whether imposing traditional orders would cause an intolerable risk of delay, 
which in turn would worsen the situation. The decision indicates that situations must be evaluated 
continuously. Even if there is a risk of delay in the initial phase of an operation, which necessitates 
immediate implementation of measures, this does not automatically imply that there is a risk of de-
lay during the entire operation. 
 
In cases of acute oil pollution at sea, immediate implementation because issuing orders 
may result in a risk of delay is of great practical importance. Rapid implementation is often 
especially important seeing that hesitation and postponement may dramatically worsen the 
situation. For example, if a vessel is in danger of running aground, the Coastal Administra-
tion may immediately intervene with the assistance of tugboats.
159
 Furthermore, imposing 
orders through the traditional procedure is often unnecessary because it is obvious to all 
involved parties that the person responsible does not have the necessary expertise or 
equipment to implement the necessary measures. 
 
6.3.4 Uncertainty regarding who is the person responsible 
The Coastal Administration may arrange for measures to be implemented immediately in 
cases of oil pollution if “it is uncertain who is responsible”, cf. §74(2). 
 
The most obvious situation comprised by the provision is where oil pollution is unexpect-
edly discovered with no indications of where it originates from and, consequently, impos-
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sible to establish the identity of the person responsible.
160
 Additionally, it occasionally oc-
curs that the person responsible refuses responsibility for a detected oil spill. Reference can 
be made to a criminal decision by the Supreme Court where an oil tanker unsuccessfully 
claimed that the oil pollution originated from another tanker.
161
 
 
Observations of oil slicks of unknown origin occur quite often along the Norwegian coast. In 75 % 
of the registered oil spills concerning vessels between 1987-1998, the person responsible was un-
known.
162
 Given that many oil spills are not registered, the percentage is presumably higher. How-
ever, such incidents are often less serious and does not require intervention by the Coastal Admin-
istration. 
 
Shipping is an industry with complex organisations of ownership, which often involve sev-
eral different establishments and partnerships. Advanced company structures may make it 
difficult to identify which company should be regarded as the person responsible in the 
aftermath of a maritime casualty. In such indistinct situations, the Coastal Administration 
may decide to implement necessary measures pursuant to the provision.
163
 Furthermore, 
situations where several parties are suspected of being the person responsible are com-
prised by the provision if it is impossible to point out the person responsible.
164
 
 
6.3.5 The extent of lawful immediate implementation of measures 
6.3.5.1 Introduction 
A key issue in relation to state intervention in cases of oil pollution is what kind of latitude 
the Coastal Administration is provided with when implementing immediate measures. The 
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Act does not address the substantive scope and extent of intervention pursuant to §74.
165
 
The issue may, perhaps more precisely, be formulated as a question of which restrictions 
the right to immediately implement measures is subject to. 
 
The Coastal Administration is entitled to “make use of and if necessary cause damage to the prop-
erty of the person responsible” when implementing immediate measures, cf. §74(3). The term 
“property” includes moving property, e.g. vessels.166 Utilisation and damaging of property can only 
take place if it is required and the benefits exceed the disadvantages.
167
 Inflicted damage or loss 
must be covered by the person responsible insofar as the intervention was regarded necessary.
168
  
 
The main issue regarding the extent of intervention is whether or not immediate implemen-
tation of measures are subject to a substantive test of reasonableness, thereby limiting the 
authority.  
 
6.3.5.2 Reasonableness as a limitation pursuant to the Pollution Act §74? 
According to the wording, the Pollution Act §74 does not directly prescribe a test of rea-
sonableness.
169
 However, one might ask if such a limitation should be interpreted into the 
provision, because of statements in the preparatory works.  
 
The preparatory works point out that §74 is based on a proposal that originally contained a 
slightly different formulation.
170
 The present provision corresponds, with some minor dif-
ferences, to §63(2) and (3) presented in NOU 1977:11. In contrast to the final provision, 
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  Neither in regulations, even though such authority is  explicitly provided in §74(4), cf. Wang 
 (2005) p. 126. 
166
  Wang (2005) p. 125. 
167
  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 165. 
168
  Bugge (1999) p. 365. 
169
  Apparently, the corresponding provision in the Svalbard Environmental Act §97 contains a test of 
 reasonableness, due to the wording “necessary”. 
170
  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 165. 
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the proposal in §63(2) included the wording “…arrange for reasonable measures…” (our 
underlining).
171
 The rephrasing and elimination of the wording “reasonable” is not ex-
plained in the preparatory works, but can hardly be considered as an inadvertence. The Pol-
lution Act uses the term reasonable in several provisions and the omission of such a word-
ing in §74 cannot be ignored. Hence, the competence pursuant to §74 is only limited by the 
doctrine of abuse of discretionary power.
172
  
 
6.3.5.3 Reasonableness as a limitation pursuant to the Pollution Act §7? 
The preparatory works and legal theory indicate that §74 must be interpreted in conjunction 
with §7 because the State’s competence to implement measures does not reach any further 
than what the person responsible is obliged to do pursuant to §7.
173
 The general reference 
to §7 creates confusion, as the duty to take action pursuant to §7(2) is limited to reasonable 
measures, while the competence to impose orders pursuant to §7(4) excludes such a test of 
reasonableness. The question is therefore whether it is §7(2) or §7(4) that sets the frame-
work for lawful implementation of measures pursuant to §74. The three different situations 
must be interpreted and treated separately. 
 
Immediate implementation of measures if orders are not carried out by the person responsi-
ble clearly refers to §7(4). The PA §74(1) states that if orders are “issued pursuant to §7(4)” 
and “these are not carried out”, the authorities may arrange for “the measures” to be im-
plemented. Consequently, the competence to immediately implement measures in these 
situations is not subject to a substantive limitation of reasonableness. 
 
                                                 
 
171
  NOU 1977:11 p. 38. 
172
  Bugge (1999) p. 329, 363-364. 
173
  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 69, Bugge (1999) p. 363-364, Wang (2005) p. 125. 
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Immediate implementation of measures if issuing orders may result in a delay or if it is 
uncertain who is responsible, is apparently subject to the same framework.
174
 The main 
difference between §74(1) and §74(2) is that §74(1) involves a previously issued order 
while §74(2) does not involve any issued orders. Immediate implementation without any 
previously issued orders lacks all the classic characteristics of an administrative decision. 
Such implementation must nevertheless be equated with administrative decisions from a 
legal point of view and is consequently subject to the limits provided in §7(4).
175
 Imposing 
the same restrictions in all three situations secures flexibility and avoids an unnecessary 
complex system. Additionally, it would be strange and unfavourable to restrict the leeway 
in situations involving pressure of time.  
 
Summing up, the extent of lawful measures pursuant to §74 is not subject to a substantive 
test of reasonableness.
176
 The only restrictions imposed on the Coastal Administration’s 
right to immediately implement measures are limitations pursuant to general administrative 
law and the doctrine of abuse of discretionary power.
177
 
 
  
                                                 
 
174
  Bugge (1999) p. 363-366. 
175
  Ibid p. 363-364. 
176
  Seemingly opposite Wang (2005) p. 129. 
177
  Bugge (1999) p. 363-364.  
 54 
7 Claim for Reimbursement 
7.1 Introduction 
Norwegian pollution- and environmental law are based on the internationally recognised 
polluter-pays principle.
178
 Accordingly, when the person responsible refuses to implement 
satisfactory measures to tackle the pollution, either on his own or when ordered to, a natu-
ral consequence is that he becomes responsible for covering the expenses incurred from 
measures implemented by other parties.  
 
The statutory basis for this reimbursement claim is the Pollution Act §76. The first para-
graph concerns reimbursement of the expenses incurred by public authorities, and reads: 
 
“The costs, damage or losses pursuant to section 74 incurred by the public authori-
ties may be claimed from the person responsible for the pollution or waste prob-
lems […] If the person responsible cannot pay or it is not known who is responsi-
ble, the costs may also be claimed from the injured party or the person whose in-
terests were served by the measures.” 
 
The specific issues that will be addressed in this section are primarily related to the sub-
stantive scope of the right to reimbursement. Therefore, the presentation will firstly give 
account for the material content of §76. However, acute marine oil pollution is also subject 
to regulation by the Maritime Code. Consequently, it is necessary to examine how these 
different set of rules are interrelated.  
 
The present section presupposes that an accident which entails acute pollution or the threat 
of acute pollution has occurred, and that the Norwegian Coastal Administration has initiat-
ed measures aiming to “prevent” pollution, “stop”, “remove” or “limit” the effects of pollu-
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  Bugge (1999) p. 176. See Birnie/Boyle/Redgwell (2009) p. 432-434 on the principle in the context 
 of international marine pollution law.  
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tion or to “mitigate any damage or nuisance” resulting from pollution. The question has 
now turned to the allocation of the economic responsibility for the implemented measures.   
 
7.2 The Substantive Scope of the Right to Reimbursement Pursuant to the 
Pollution Act §76 
7.2.1 The addressee of the claim 
The addressee of the claim for reimbursement is the “person responsible”, cf. first sentence. 
The wording refers to the same individual, entity or legal person as the corresponding term 
in §§7 and 46. To reiterate briefly, the Reder will generally be considered the person re-
sponsible.  
 
7.2.2 Alternative addressee of the claim    
According to §76 third sentence, the costs may also be claimed from the “injured party” or 
“the person whose interests were served by the measures”, provided that the person respon-
sible “cannot pay” or if it is “not known who is responsible”. This provision has a subsidi-
ary character as against the duty of the person responsible to reimburse.
179
 This is evident 
from §77(1), which entitles the private person that has to pay for the costs to claim recourse 
from the person responsible. 
 
The rationale behind the rule is that when the public authorities implement measures to 
protect private interests, it is more reasonable that the private party bears the expenses in-
curred in his interest rather than the State.
180
 
 
As mentioned above, it happens quite frequently that oil slicks of unknown origin are de-
tected. Occasionally, the responsible Reder does not have the economic means to settle the 
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  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 168 and NOU 1977:11 p. 35.  
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reimbursement claim or the Rederi may be dissolved and therefore unable to provide for 
payment. In such scenarios, the person who has benefited from the measures, for instance 
by cleansing of his private beach, may have to bear the costs. It must nevertheless be em-
phasised that this represents the exception rather than the rule. 
    
7.2.3 Costs, damage or losses 
According to §76 first paragraph, the Coastal Administration can claim the “costs, damage 
or losses” which the State has incurred pursuant to §74. As accounted for in subsection 6.3 
above, there are three types of situations in which the State may immediately implement 
measures. The extent of the right to reimbursement must be assessed separately for each of 
these situations.
181
 Thus, it is reimbursement of the hereto related costs that can be claimed.   
 
The fact that §76 prescribes that it is the losses “pursuant to section 74” that can be claimed 
implies a requirement of a causal link between the reimbursement claim and the aim of the 
measures undertaken.
182
 Consequently, as far as the costs are related to measures aiming to 
prevent pollution, stop, remove or limit the effects of pollution or to mitigate any damage 
or nuisance resulting from pollution, cf. §7(4) cf. §7(2), the Coastal Administration can 
claim reimbursement. Furthermore, these measures must be considered adequate based on a 
professional appraisal at the time of implementation. 
 
Since the doctrine of abuse of discretionary power represents the lower threshold when 
determining which measures should be reimbursed, the Coastal Administration’s access to 
reimbursement is extensive. Costs related to measures that the Coastal Administration 
could foresee would be ineffective or other measures which goes beyond mitigating the 
damages are outside the scope of the provision. 
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Concerning the practical settlement of the claim, it is assumed that the public authorities may par-
tially recover their claim by selling any potential assets which they acquire through the operation, 
based on §76 combined with non-statutory law.
183
 In a maritime oil pollution situation, one can im-
agine that oil collected through the use of booms and skimmers still will be of value. Likewise, the 
wrecked ship might still have a value, i.e. as scrap metal. When the Authorities sell these items, 
parts of the claims will be set off.    
 
7.3 The Relationship to the Rules on Compensation for Pollution Damage 
pursuant to the Pollution Act Chapter 8 
Although the reimbursement claim has many similarities to an ordinary doctrine of strict 
liability for damages, the two concepts must be set apart. That is, because the Pollution Act 
adopts a dual-tracked system where liability for damages is regulated separately in chapter 
8. The scope of the rules on liability is listed in §57 letters a-e. Of particular interest is the 
provision in letter b), which states that the liability for damages includes “compensation for 
damage, losses, nuisance or expenses” that are incurred as a result of taking “reasonable 
measures to prevent, limit, remove or mitigate” pollution damage.184  
 
The resemblance between the expenses that can be claimed pursuant to the liability rules 
and the expenses that may be claimed reimbursed is striking, and evidences that the differ-
ent sets of rules overlap each other to a considerable extent. Additionally, the basis for lia-
bility is predominantly the same for each alternative; as a strict liability is adopted either 
the claim is set forth as a compensation claim or a reimbursement claim.
185
 Nevertheless, 
the preparatory works explicitly states that the rules on reimbursement and liability for 
damages shall coexist, and that the latter shall function as a supplement to §76.
186
 Conse-
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  Bugge (1999) p. 416. 
186
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quently, in certain circumstances the Coastal Administration will have the possibility to 
choose which of the two alternative tracks they will follow when pursuing their claim.
187
 
As a result, the Coastal Administration may base its claim on the rules on liability for dam-
ages pursuant to §57 if a claim for reimbursement pursuant to §76 cannot be set forth, for 
instance because the order imposed pursuant to §7(4) was invalid.    
 
It is stated in §53(1) that the chapter applies to the duty to pay compensation for pollution damage 
“insofar as the question of liability is not separately regulated by other legislation or a contract”. 
An example of such special regulation is found in the Maritime Code, which will be accounted for. 
However, the provisions in the Pollution Act chapter 8 are not completely disregarded, as it will 
supplement the special regulation.
188
   
 
7.4 The Relationship to the Maritime Code 
7.4.1 Introduction 
Besides the Pollution Act, marine oil pollution is additionally subject to regulation by the 
Maritime Code. Seeing that the regulations pursuant to these acts are not identical, the rela-
tionship between them must be examined further. Firstly, the scope of the Maritime Code 
will be accounted for, and then it will be assessed how the two sets of rules can be harmo-
nised.    
 
The relevant provisions in the Maritime Code are found in chapter 10, parts I and II respec-
tively. The legislative background of the rules is the implementation of international con-
ventions, namely, the Liability Convention and the Bunker Convention.  
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7.4.2 Scope of the Maritime Code §§183 and 191 
The Maritime Code §183 represents the point of departure for liability for bunker oil pollu-
tion, and prescribes strict liability for “pollution damage […] caused by fuel oil” on the 
“shipowner”, cf. first paragraph. Fuel oil is statutorily defined in the fourth paragraph as 
“all oils containing hydrocarbon fluid, including grease, intended for operating the ship or 
its propulsion, as well as remnants of such oil”.189  
 
Pollution damage caused by fuel oil is defined in detail in the second paragraph a) and b). 
According to letter a), the term comprises “damage or loss” occurring “of the ship” that is 
caused by pollution from fuel oil that is “escaping or drained from the ship”. When the pol-
lution has led to diminishment of the environment, the recoverable expenses are limited to 
those that relate to “reasonable” measures. According to letter b), also “expenses, damage 
or loss” due to “reasonable measures” that are implemented after an accident that “causes 
or entails immediate and considerable danger for damage” as mentioned in letter a) and that 
“aim to prevent or limit such damage” are included. There is one important limitation in the 
tenth paragraph, that is, that part I of the chapter does not apply to pollution damage cov-
ered by §191(2).   
 
The Maritime Code §191, which implements the Liability Convention, has a similar con-
tent, as this provision served as a model for the design of §183. Thus, the provision adopts 
a strict liability for “the owner of a ship” for “oil pollution damage”, cf. first paragraph. 
Likewise, the second paragraph, letters a) and b) define oil pollution damage in a quite sim-
ilar manner.  
 
There are, however, some fundamental differences between the two regulations, the most 
significant being the type of ship that is subject to regulation. While a “ship” in chapter 10 
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  In the translation of the Maritime Code published in MarIus (2010) no. 393, it seems as the last half
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 therefore been translated by the authors.   
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part I refers to “any seagoing vessel or other floating device on the sea”, cf. §183(3), it re-
fers only to floating constructions “designed to carry oil in bulk” that in fact is “carrying oil 
as cargo in bulk and during subsequent voyages” in part II of the chapter, cf. §191(3). 
Which category the vessel falls within entails several consequences, first and foremost 
which limitation of liability scheme applies.   
 
The substantive content of each criterion will not be subject to further elaboration, except 
from where they need to be in order to clarify the relationship to the Pollution Act. For the 
purpose of this thesis, it is at this point sufficient to demonstrate that the two provisions 
cover different situations, but they will both to a considerable extent coincide and overlap 
with the provisions in the Pollution Act. 
         
The regulation of oil pollution liability provided by the MC has several implications. Of 
major importance is that incidents that fall within the scope of these rules are subjected to 
limitation of liability. As a consequence, the party liable for polluting will in many cases 
not be required to pay full compensation, as he may be entitled to limit his liability. As the 
system provided by the PA is based on the polluter-pays principle and that the person re-
sponsible has an unlimited responsibility for compensation and reimbursement, a funda-
mental divergence is established between the two set of rules. The following presentation 
aims to account for how the two sets of regulations can be applied and harmonised.      
 
7.4.3 Applicability of the Maritime Code on the reimbursement claim 
The Maritime Code §185(1) declares that “[c]laims for indemnification against the ship-
owner for pollution damage caused by fuel oil may only be asserted by the rules under Sec-
tions 183 to 190”. Correspondingly, §193(1) states that “[c]laims for compensation for oil 
pollution damage can only be made against the owner of a ship according to the provisions 
of the Chapter”. Clearly, the provisions assert exclusive application on the area of oil pollu-
tion damage. This is in line with the articles in the Conventions which the provisions seek 
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to adopt, with the homologous wording; “[n]o claim for compensation for pollution damage 
shall be made against the shipowner otherwise than in accordance with this Convention”.190 
Consequently, if the Coastal Administration’s claim is not covered by these convention-
based rules, they cannot pursue the shipowner under a different basis of liability.
191
     
 
As demonstrated, claims for reimbursement pursuant to the PA overlap with the rules in the 
MC chapter 10. It is therefore of considerable interest to determine to what extent the reim-
bursement claim is subjected to regulation also by the MC, as the reimbursement claim in 
that case would be comprised by the rules on limitation of liability. It might additionally 
affect the evaluation of which measures that the Coastal Authorities may claim reimbursed. 
In order to clarify this issue, the first question that must be addressed is whether the word-
ing “[c]laims for indemnification” and “[c]laims for compensation” in the Maritime Code 
§§185 and 193 comprises the reimbursement claim pursuant to the Pollution Act §76.
192
  
 
The answer to this issue does not immediately stand out as clear. On one hand, there is the 
strictly linguistic argument. While §76 speaks about payment of the costs of measures to 
deal with pollution, namely, reimbursement, the provisions in the MC refers to claims for 
compensation for oil pollution damage. Thus, there is a semantic difference. This may be 
interpreted as an argument that there is also a substantive difference between the phrases 
and that the reimbursement claim is not comprised by the Maritime Code.  
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The linguistic argument is furthermore strengthened by the fact that the Pollution Act, as 
displayed above, has a separate system for compensation for pollution damage in chapter 8, 
which applies independently from the rules regarding the reimbursement claim. Additional-
ly, such a distinction is not adopted in the Maritime Code, which might imply that the Code 
solely aims to regulate claims for compensation and not claims for reimbursement.                  
 
Finally, it might be taken into consideration that the Pollution Act §53(1) states that chapter 
8 applies to “the duty to pay compensation for pollution damage insofar as the question of 
liability is not separately regulated by other legislation or a contract”. According to the pre-
paratory works, this provision primarily concerns situations of pollution damage where the 
question of liability, including the basis and subjects of liability, is regulated in the special 
legislation.
193
 A similar reservation is not expressed in the statute as far as the reimburse-
ment claim is concerned, which might imply that the two claims are substantively different.      
 
On the other hand, the substantive differences between the two types of claims are not 
great, and should not be exaggerated. As evidenced, the claims encompass each other to a 
large extent. This is especially noticeable for the reimbursement claim and compensation 
claim pursuant to the Pollution Act, which will often both be applicable. That the nuances 
between the two type of claims are of such minor character is a fact that weighs against 
regarding the reimbursement claim as not being comprised by the claim for compensation 
pursuant to the Maritime Code.  
 
Furthermore, too much emphasis should not be put on the circumstance that the different 
acts utilise different wording. After all, the relevant provisions in the MC primarily aim to 
implement the Bunker Convention and the Liability Convention. Seeing that the Conven-
tions make use of the phrase “claim for compensation”, it is only natural that the statutes 
utilise the same terminology. The Pollution Act has therefore neither been the template, nor 
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the most influential factor when modelling the provisions and it may accordingly be held 
that the difference in wording should not be given too much attribution.   
 
In continuation, the preparatory works also comment on the issue: 
 
“According to the regulations concerning liability for oil pollution from ships, the 
strict liability is limited. The rules on limitation of liability take precedent over the 
duty to pay for measures pursuant to § 66”.194  
     
The citation displays the only comments that are provided, and the issue is not elaborated 
upon. Nevertheless, the statements are clear and undoubtedly rest on the assumption that 
the reimbursement claim is comprised by the provisions in the Maritime Code.  
 
Regardless, it would not be a desirable situation if the Coastal Administration could cir-
cumvent the limitation rules in the MC simply by categorising the claim as a reimburse-
ment claim rather than a claim for compensation. Not only would such a situation arrange 
for a state of law that would be utterly unpredictable for the affected parties, but it would 
also bring the State of Norway in breach of its international obligations pursuant to the 
Conventions.   
 
Moreover, that the Maritime Code is applicable on the reimbursement claim is supported in 
legal theory. Bugge does not examine the issue in detail, but nonetheless states clearly 
enough that “where a claim for reimbursement is set forth pursuant to the Pollution Act §76 
in an clean-up operation subsequent to a maritime casualty comprised by the Maritime 
Code chapter 10, the rules in the Maritime Code will […] take precedent”.195 
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Therefore, it must be concluded that the reimbursement claim pursuant to the Pollution Act 
§76 should be interpreted as being comprised by §§185 and 193 in the Maritime Code. The 
question also seems to be answered in the affirmative in practice, as the State’s reimburse-
ment claim has been subject to limitation in several occasions.
196
 Reference can, inter alia, 
be made to the accidents concerning “Green Ålesund” and “Rocknes”.197 It is thus a claim 
for compensation in the terminology of the Maritime Code chapter 10, hence, the hereto 
accompanying regulations of chapter 10 apply. As a result, the reimbursement claim must 
be assessed against the regulations provided by the Maritime Code. This entails several 
significant legal effects, the most conspicuous is perhaps that the reimbursement claim be-
comes subject to the limitation rules.  
 
However, some additional assessments must be made. That is, because even though the 
provisions in the MC are similar to those in the PA, they are not identical. On some key 
areas it is therefore necessary to examine the provisions in the Maritime Code in some de-
tail, to display how they interfere with – and must be harmonised with – the Pollution Act. 
Two issues will be addressed; firstly the addressee of the claims and secondly the kind of 
measures that can be included in the reimbursement claim.      
 
7.5 Applying the Rules in the Maritime Code on the Reimbursement Claim 
7.5.1 The addressee of the claims 
The person responsible is, as previously established, the addressee of the reimbursement 
claim pursuant to the Pollution Act. The person responsible cannot be predefined, but will 
vary according to the circumstances. Most often, however, the responsibility will be in-
cumbent on the Reder. The Maritime Code, on the other hand, places the responsibility on 
the ship owner. As evidenced, the Reder is not always the owner of the ship. Additionally, 
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the term ship owner may itself have a different meaning depending on the circumstances. 
The closer content of the term shipowner pursuant to the Maritime Code will therefore nec-
essarily be elucidated. Since the MC claims exclusive application in this relation, the sub-
jects of liability in the context of the reimbursement claim must be interpreted in line with 
the rules in the MC.  
 
The subjects of liability in the Maritime code are the “shipowner” and “the owner of a 
ship” respectively, cf. §§183(1) and 191(1). Although the wording is similar, they are statu-
tory defined in different ways. With respect to the term in §183, the definition provided in 
the fifth paragraph proclaims that “shipowner” shall be interpreted as “the owner, including 
the registered owner, the Reder, the bareboat charterer, the manager or others responsible 
for central functions relevant to the running of the ship”.198 Consequently, the term ship-
owner is quite broad, and may refer to several different persons or companies, and there is 
nothing preventing that multiple entities have owner status simultaneously.
199
 This is espe-
cially evident because of the generic phrase “…others responsible for central functions 
relevant to the running of the ship”, which makes it less important to lay down the specific 
content of the other listed persons.  
 
The Maritime Code §191(5), on the other hand, defines the term “owner of a ship” as “the 
person registered as owner in the Ship Register”, and as “the person who owns the ship” if 
the ship is not registered in the Ship Registry. Clearly, the definition is more narrow, as it 
leaves out many of the persons that are included in the definition in §183. Most noticeable 
is perhaps the exclusion of the bareboat charterer and the Reder. What is more, these par-
ties are among the subjects who are comprised by the rules on channelling of liability pur-
suant to §193, cf. particularly (2)c). Consequently, the liability is directed towards the own-
er of the ship. The main rationale behind channelling liability is that the injured party is 
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considered to be sufficiently protected by the strict liability imposed on the shipowner and 
that exposing other parties to liability would lead to uncertainty, especially in relation to 
insurance matters.
200
  
 
The registered owner of a ship has a statutory duty to obtain satisfactory insurance, in relation to 
both Conventions, cf. the Maritime Code §§186 and 197. If this obligation is breached, the ship 
may be subject to sanctions, cf. §§187 and 199. Practically, claims are often brought directly be-
fore the insurance company, typically the P&I insurer, cf. §§188 and 200. It is especially when the 
insurance proves insufficient to cover the losses that a claimant, e.g. the State, will have the benefit 
of pursuing other parties that may fall within the owner terms. An example may be if the shipown-
er’s liability exceeds the insurance limits of the Bunker Convention.201  
   
As a final observation, it can be concluded that the definition of shipowner pursuant to 
§183(5) to a large extent coincides with the content of the term person responsible pursuant 
to the Pollution Act. However, the definition of owner in §191(5) differs quite considerably 
from the definition in the Pollution Act, as it points out a far more limited circle of persons. 
Nevertheless, in the event of acute marine oil pollution the PA must be interpreted in line 
with the statutory definitions in MC chapter 10. For instance, if a vessel that is fixed on a 
bareboat charter suffers a maritime casualty comprised by MC §191, the registered owner 
would be the subject of liability. As opposed to in the PA, where it would probably be the 
bareboat charterer, Reder, as owner pro hac vice. As the example illustrates, the practical 
implications may be considerable since the addressee of the reimbursement claim could 
differ.    
 
7.5.2 Recoverable costs  
Attention is now turned towards the measures for which the Coastal Administration can 
claim reimbursement. Seeing that the Maritime Code assumes exclusive applicability for 
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this specific type of marine pollution, cf. §§185 and 193, it is necessary to examine the reg-
ulation in the MC on this point a bit further. A central issue is therefore whether these rules 
provide a right to claim reimbursement which differs from the Pollution Act §76.  
 
The point of departure pursuant to the MC is the definitions of “pollution damage caused 
by fuel oil” and “oil pollution damage” in §§183(2) a) and b) and 191(2) a) and b). The 
content of the two provisions will primarily be addressed jointly as a whole, for the reason 
that they are virtually identical.
202
  
 
According to the letters a) first sentences, the term essentially comprises “damage or loss” 
resulting from oil “escaping” or being “drained” from the ship. This includes “loss of prof-
its”, but when the damage has caused “impairment of the environment” only expenses for 
“reasonable measures” that have been or will be undertaken are covered, cf. second sen-
tence.                               
 
With respect to letters b), they expand the term pollution damage to cover “expenses, dam-
age or loss” due to “reasonable measures” incurred after an incident that “causes or entails 
immediate and considerable risk of damage as mentioned in letter a”, and the purpose of 
which is to “prevent or limit such damage”.203 Furthermore, that the loss must be “due to” 
reasonable measures implies a requirement of a causal link between the claim and the aim 
of the measures.
204
  
 
A particular issue relating to the criterion of a causal link is costs deriving from various consult-
ants’ fees. One can particularly raise questions concerning expenses that the State incur when hir-
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 have been discharged, pursuant to the Liability Convention 1969. In ND-1988-117 the Helsingfors
 City Court answered the question in the affirmative. The judgment was rightfully criticised by Selvig
 (1991).    
204
  Correspondingly; CMI-guidelines section 10e).  
 68 
ing media advisors. Even though taking such measures may be desirable, one may ask if these 
costs are sufficiently connected to preventing and limiting pollution damage.        
 
While both letters a) concern the situation where an oil spill has already occurred, it is suf-
ficient that such a situation threatens to occur according to letters b).
205
 The preparatory 
works does not provide much guidance with regard to the specific content of the criteria. 
Only a few concrete examples are given, such as, that loss of profit will include the losses 
incurred by a fish farm or a tourist facility because of the oil pollution, and measures to 
restore the environment comprises cleaning of oil from the sea and shore, cf. letters a).
206
 
Furthermore, measures to prevent and limit the damage will typically be emergency dis-
charge of the oil from a wrecked ship.  
 
As there seems to be limited amounts of legal sources available that can provide clarification of 
which specific costs can be claimed reimbursed, it may be relevant to consider if there are any in-
ternationally established guidelines or standards that can shed light on the issue. One such docu-
ment is the EU States Claims Management Guidelines which is a product of the European Mari-
time Safety Agency (henceforth referred to as the EMSA-guidelines). These guidelines have been 
used as a point of reference in Norwegian court cases. In the judgment of Bergen City Court in the 
Fjord Champion-case, the judge stated that the Guidelines had no formal authority, but would nev-
ertheless provide guidance because it was assumed to express opinions of best practice on the ar-
ea.
207
 The grounds of the judgment certainly evidences that the Guidelines was ascribed significant 
weight. The Court of Appeal and the Interlocutory Appeals Committee of the Supreme Court did 
not utilise the EMSA-guidelines, as questions concerning recoverable costs were not a subject-
matter. In the Server-case, the solutions prescribed by the guidelines have also been argued, but are 
clearly ascribed less weight than in the Fjord Champion-case.
208
   
   
                                                 
 
205
  It is presumed that the provisions correspond to the content of the Pollution Act §§57 cf. 58, so that
 the rules in the Conventions, the Maritime Code and the Pollution Act are coterminous on this point,
 cf. Bråfelt (2012) note 365.   
206
  Ot.prp.nr.77 (2006-2007) p. 9. 
207
  Case no. 11-105297TVI-BBYR/01 p. 16.  
208
  Serverrapporten section 6.7.  
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Even though the EMSA-guidelines can be relevant source to look at, it should be emphasised that 
its authority as a legal source must be limited. That is, because the parties that developed the doc-
ument was primarily public bodies from the EU and EEA States – and not other private stakehold-
ers – which consequently give the guidelines a somewhat distorted view. This is illustrated by the 
purpose of the Guidelines which is, inter alia, to assist the States in achieving successful recovery 
of costs.
209
 It must therefore be used with some scepticism.    
 
Evidently, the scope of the measures that can be claimed pursuant to §§183 and 191 are to 
a large extent congruent with the provisions in the Pollution Act. At least, all the elements 
that are set forth in these two provisions are covered by the PA §§76 cf. 74 and 7. The 
question is, however, whether the provisions in the Maritime Code are more restricted in 
terms of what measures that are included, seeing that these provisions explicitly limit the 
liability to “reasonable measures”.  
 
7.5.2.1 Reasonable measures             
Considering that the conclusion above was that the Pollution Act does not adopt a substan-
tive limitation of reasonableness with regards to what measures that can be claimed per-
formed and alternatively reimbursed by the liable party, the provisions seemingly differ on 
this point. Thus, it is necessary to examine the content of the limitation to “reasonable 
measures” pursuant to the Maritime Code §§183(2) and 191(2) letters a) and b) in further 
detail.  
 
It should be mentioned that the premises for the assessment are slightly different pursuant 
to the two sets of rules. With respect to the PA, the assessment concerned what measures 
the person responsible had an obligation to implement and could be ordered to implement, 
while the assessment pursuant to the MC is related to the economic liability for which the 
shipowner is responsible. Regardless, the starting point in both cases must be an evaluation 
                                                 
 
209
  EMSA-Guidelines section 1.3.   
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of proportionality; a more serious occurrence of pollution requires more comprehensive 
measures. 
 
The content of the phrase reasonable measures is neither elaborated upon in the preparato-
ry works, nor has it been subject to examination by Norwegian Courts. Guidance must 
therefore be sought in alternative sources. In this respect, it is of relevance that there are 
some international documents that lay down how certain international bodies interpret the 
term. As the provisions are based on international conventions, such documents are also of 
relevance pursuant to Norwegian law.  
 
For one, the criterion is commented in the so-called CMI-guidelines.
210
 With respect to 
preventive measures, clean-up and restoration, the Guidelines state that the measures must 
be “likely […] to be effective in avoiding or minimising pollution damage” based on an 
“objective technical appraisal at the time any relevant decisions were taken”.211 It is em-
phasised that compensation cannot be refused solely on the grounds that the measures 
proved ineffective or that mobilised equipment proves not to be required. However, accord-
ing to the Guidelines a claim should be refused if the measures that were implemented 
“could not be justified on an objective technical appraisal in the circumstances existing at 
the relevant time, of the likelihood of the measures succeeding, or of mobilised equipment 
being required”.    
 
                                                 
 
210
  Comité Maritime International (CMI) “Guidelines on Oil Pollution Damage (1994)”. The guidelines
 are not legally binding, but are of relevance as they aim to clarify to which extent costs are 
 recoverable under the law as applied in the majority of countries that are party to the Convention and
 promote a consistent approach.  
211
  CMI-guidelines article 10b).  
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The interpretation in the CMI-guidelines conforms on several points with the interpreta-
tions provided in the so-called IOPC-guidelines.
212
 These guidelines similarly state that the 
assessment must be made “on the basis of objective criteria” and according to “the facts 
available at the time of the decision to take the measures”.213 Furthermore, that costs are 
not accepted “when it could have been foreseen that the measures taken would be ineffec-
tive”, but if measures prove to be ineffective, it is not in itself a reason for rejecting a 
claim.
214
  
 
With respect to mitigation and restoration of the environment, both guides make it clear 
that not only measures relating specifically to the clean-up operation are included, but also 
that measures promoting the restoration of the damaged environment and assisting its natu-
ral recovery are as a starting point reasonable.
215
    
 
Recurrent themes throughout both sets of guidelines are proportionality and objectivity. 
The measures for which the expenses can be claimed recovered must be proportionate 
compared with the damage that has or threatens to occur. Thus, it is to a certain extent nec-
essary to carry out a cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, this assessment must be based on 
objective, technical criteria. If these conditions are present at the time of implementation, it 
is apparent that even costs relating to measures that are in fact useless are recoverable. 
Such an interpretation is, besides, in accordance with the precautionary principle.
216
          
                                                 
 
212
  The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds) has published a “Claims Manual
 (2013)”, which in section 3 sets forth guidelines on the submission of different types of claim to the
 fund. The manual is clearly of relevance, but it should be noted that it does not address legal issues 
 in detail and should not be seen as an authoritative interpretation, cf. p. 6 
213
  IOPC-guidelines section 3.1.5. See also Falkanger/Bul/Brautaset (2011) p. 211.  
214
  IOPC-guidelines section 3.1.6. 
215
  See the CMI-guidelines section 12 and the IOPC-guidelines section 3.6, which specifically 
 address the scope of compensation for environmental damage.  
216
  See Birnie/Boyle/Redgwell (2009) p. 152-164 regarding the principle in the context of international
 law. 
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In conclusion, it seems to be significant similarity between the rules in the Pollution Act 
and the Maritime Code on this point, despite the existence of the reasonable criterion in the 
latter. Evidently, the criterion is interpreted quite broadly, and the lower threshold appears 
to be that measures that are knowingly ineffective at the time of implementation are not 
reasonable. Consequently, the Coastal Administration will also enjoy considerable authori-
ty pursuant to the rules in the MC. The shipowner, or Reder, will therefore in many situa-
tion risk liability for the costs of measures that has no effect or in another way proves un-
successful. As Selvig expresses, it must be accepted that the oil pollution liability pursuant 
to the MC also gives the pollution control authority significant discretion when determining 
what orders or actions that can be imposed to avoid environmental damage, and that the 
Courts can only intervene if “disproportionate expensive measures” are imposed.217    
 
The lower threshold therefore seems to be similar to the threshold pursuant to the PA, i.e. 
the doctrine of abuse of discretionary power, which provides that the measures cannot be 
grossly unreasonable. That the provisions should be interpreted in the same way is addi-
tionally supported by the fact that the potential borderline has not been actualised in case 
law. Even though it cannot be completely ruled out that the assessment can be slightly dif-
ferent in a concrete situation, this does not alter this main conclusion. 
 
7.5.3 Calculation of the claim 
While the Pollution Act §76 prescribes that “costs, damage or losses” may be claimed re-
imbursed, the Maritime Code §§183b) and 191b) uses the phrase “expenses, damage or 
loss”.218 The point of departure pursuant to both set of rules is consequently that the 
Coastal Administration must incur an economic loss. This is a fundamental precondition in 
any area related to the law of damages, and is seldom difficult to ascertain. However, the 
provisions do not give any indication as to the calculation of the subsequent claim. Since 
                                                 
 
217
  Selvig (1999).  
218
  The authentic Norwegian text uses the phrase “[u]tgifter, skade eller tap” in both relations.  
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the chosen method for calculating the claim potentially has great influence on the size of 
the claimable amount, this issue needs to be examined closer.   
 
7.5.3.1 Net loss  
The first question is naturally which method of calculation applies, since several different 
schemes for the assessment of damages exist. It is obvious that the provisions in the MC 
are ordinary claims for damages, and consequently the ordinary principles of tort law are 
applicable. As demonstrated, the reimbursement claim pursuant to §76 is of a slightly dif-
ferent nature. Nevertheless, the preparatory works state that the principles of tort law also 
apply to this set of rules.
219
   
 
As a result, the starting point is that the claimant should be put in the same economic posi-
tion as he was before the accident took place.
220
 This implies not only that compensation 
must be sufficient to cover the losses, but also that some benefits gained by the claimant 
may be entered as deductible, cf. the doctrine of compensatio lucri cum damno.
221
  
 
Support for such a method of calculation can be found in the CMI-guidelines section 10f), 
which states; “[w]here equipment or material is reasonably purchased for the purpose of 
preventive or clean-up measures, compensation is payable for the cost of acquisition, but is 
always subject to a deduction for the residual value of such equipment or material after 
completion of the measures”. Likewise, the IOPC-guidelines section 3.1.11 express that the 
“cost of equipment purchased for a particular spill” should be subject to “deductions […] to 
take into account the remaining value of the equipment”.  
 
                                                 
 
219
  Ot.prp.nr.11 (1979-1980) p. 168 and NOU 1977:11 p. 19.  
220
  Lødrup (2009) p. 447.  
221
  Lødrup (2009) p. 448 and Hagstrøm (2001) p. 159.  
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The Guidelines outline a situation that is not unpractical. Reference can be made to the 
Server-accident, where the State had to purchase some equipment specifically for that op-
eration. Such equipment will represent an asset which also can be utilised in subsequent 
operations. The remaining value must therefore be deducted, i.e. written off according to 
the expected economic lifespan of the respective equipment. Moreover, in practice, it also 
seems to be assumed that it is the net loss that can be claimed.
222
 
 
The conclusion is therefore that the reimbursement claim must be calculated on the basis of 
a net loss method.        
 
7.5.3.2 Full cost or excess costs 
A matter that has been subject to some discussion and uncertainty is whether or not the 
Coastal administration can claim the full costs reimbursed, including both fixed costs and 
excess costs, or only the excess costs.  
 
The question arises as the Coastal Administration maintains a level of permanent prepared-
ness and has some vessels, personnel and equipment in place regardless of whether an ac-
cident has occurred. Consequently, the fixed costs of having these resources available will 
accrue in any event.        
 
On one hand it may therefore be claimed that these expenses should be excluded from the 
reimbursement claim, and that only the excess costs is recoverable. Such costs will typical-
ly be extra bunker expenses, overtime payment of existing personnel, expenses of hiring 
extra personnel, additional wear and tear and cleaning of vessels and equipment. Such an 
interpretation may immediately seem reasonable. After all, this is the solution that is the 
most natural consequence of applying the net loss method; the Coastal Administration 
should be put in the same position as they would be in if the incident had not occurred. 
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  Serverrapporten section 6.1.5.  
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Thus, fixed costs are not a loss incurred because of the incident, as they would accrue re-
gardless, and on this basis not subject to reimbursement.  
 
In continuation, it may be held that if the fixed costs were also included, the Coastal Ad-
ministration would receive an unwarranted benefit. That is, because these fixed costs are 
included in the budgets and, accordingly, finances are already allocated by the State.  
 
On the other hand, one may argue that if only the excess costs were recoverable, the ship-
owner would in certain circumstances benefit from a state intervention because it would be 
less expensive than hiring a private contractor. This would result in a non-desirable situa-
tion.  
 
There is seemingly no Norwegian case law concerning the issue.
223
 There are, however, 
some cases from other Scandinavian jurisdictions that are of relevance. Reference can be 
made to the Tsesis-case.
224
 A vessel ran aground, resulting in considerable oil pollution 
damage. The Court of Appeal decided that expenses related to the permanent preparedness 
of the Swedish Coast Guard were recoverable, such as crew wages and certain other ex-
penses incurred by the engaged vessels.
225
 
 
This interpretation is in accordance with the opinion of the Maritime Law Commission, 
which states that it is natural that expenses for permanent preparedness are comprised by 
the compensation claim insofar as the equipment has been used or its value has decreased 
when preventing or limiting damage in a concrete incident.
226
   
 
                                                 
 
223
  It should be noted that in case 11-105297TVI-BBYR/01 (Fjord Champion), the District Court 
 calculated the claim on the basis of a full cost method, see p. 16-17. 
224
  ND-1981-1. 
225
  This question was not a subject-matter in the subsequent Supreme Court case.          
226
  Selvig (1983) p. IX. 
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This interpretation is maintained in two Danish cases of grounding entailing a risk of pollu-
tion; “Brage Pacific” and “Minerva”, which both concerned the Danish Maritime Code 
§191.
227
 In “Brage Pacific”, the Court admitted that expenses were recoverable for regular 
wages to the crew on the vessels from the Defence Command which was engaged in the 
State’s operation, despite the Reder’s argument that these would be incurred regardless of 
the accident.
228
 Similarly, in “Minerva”, the Court found that the State could recover crew 
wages, use of resources, maintenance and administration of the engaged vessels, based on a 
calculation of accrued time.
229
 Hence, case law opts for including the fixed costs.      
 
Furthermore, the opinion in legal theory appears to adhere to the interpretation laid down 
by these cases. Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset state that “[e]ven expenses relating to permanent 
preparedness, which would have been incurred in any event, will be covered”.230 Likewise, 
Selvig states that the “costs related to resources that form a part of the government’s oil 
pollution preparedness may also be claimed covered”.231   
 
Moreover, the IOPC-guidelines support this view, cf. section 3.1.11 and 3.1.14. The latter 
proclaims that; compensation is also paid for a “reasonable proportion of so-called fixed 
costs” that are incurred by public- and quasi-public bodies, namely, “costs that would have 
arisen for the authorities or bodies even if the incident had not occurred, such as normal 
salaries for permanently employed personnel”.  
 
Considering all the presented legal sources, the conclusion must be that fixed costs also are 
subject to reimbursement. Thus, an exception is made from the principle that only the strict 
loss should be compensated and that the claimant should be put in the same position as he 
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  The provision corresponds to the Norwegian §191.  
228
  ND-2005-524. 
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  ND-2005-532. 
230
  Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset (2011) p. 211.  
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  Selvig (2012), see also Selvig (1983) p. IX.  
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would be in if the incident had not occurred. Policy considerations support this solution. 
That is, because it is reasonable that the polluter pays the costs of oil preparedness, seeing 
that this system is implemented as a result of the activity he/she represents.   
 
7.6 The Requirement of Implementation with Due Diligence  
When the Coastal Administration intervenes pursuant to the Pollution Act §74 they are 
under an obligation to act with due diligence, even though this is not explicitly stated in the 
statutory text.
232
 This duty must not be confused with the question of the Coastal Admin-
istration’s discretion as to what measures that should be implemented in the specific case. 
As established above, this is an assessment of appropriateness, an assessment over which 
the Coastal Administration has exclusive authority. The requirement of due diligence, on 
the other hand, concerns the very performance of the individual measure that is chosen, and 
is probably an issue that the Courts can review.  
 
Although this duty is not laid down by written law, it should be considered valid as it is 
solidly supported by considerations of fairness and loyalty. Additionally, it may be seen as 
a general expression of the right to mitigate losses, by ensuring that the responsible person 
does not suffer from a failure in the performance of a measure over which he cannot exer-
cise control.  
 
It is, nevertheless, undoubtedly so that there must be a certain margin for errors, seeing that 
a situation of acute maritime pollution entails significant uncertainty and necessitates diffi-
cult deliberations, often combined with time pressure. Consequently, within reasonable 
limits the person responsible must recognise that he is liable for some expenses that appear 
as less sensible, when reviewed in retrospect. The assessment of whether or not the duty of 
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  Bugge (1999) p. 364.   
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due diligence is breached must be based on the knowledge possessed by the decision-
makers and performing parties at the point in time when the implementation takes place.
233
           
 
However, it is not only measures that prove less sensible may be subject to scrutiny when 
assessing if the duty is complied with. A particular issue that has proven to be somewhat 
disputed in practice is whether or not the Coastal Administration could have carried out the 
measure at a lower cost, e.g. when acquiring services from independent contractors. Refer-
ence can be made to Server-case, where this has been an issue. Subsequent to the accident a 
limitation fund was established, since it was clear that the reimbursement claim would ex-
ceed the Reder’s limited liability pursuant to the Maritime Code §§172a cf. 175a.234 The 
representatives of the Reder submitted to the fund administrator
235
 that the Coastal Admin-
istration had breached its duty of implementation with due diligence, because they did not 
act in accordance with the “Act relating to public procurement 16 July 1999 no. 69”. The 
fund administrator found that the Coastal Administration had breached the regulations in 
the Act, and that there was a foreseeable causal link between the breach and the alleged 
increased costs.
236
 Parts of the claim set forth by the Coastal Administration were therefore 
reduced on a discretionary basis. There is, however, reason to believe that the threshold 
will be set quite high for reducing such claims, as consideration must be made to the stress-
ful character of an acute situation, as well as proving the causal link between the breach 
and the increased costs; it will presumably be difficult to document.  
 
The breach of the duty to act with due diligence may furthermore entail more severe conse-
quences, provided that it is sufficiently serious. For instance, the State may incur liability 
for damages itself. If the Coastal Administration acts negligently, by e.g. causing clearly 
                                                 
 
233
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unnecessary damage on the vessel during the operation, the State may become liable on the 
basis of “Act relating to compensation in certain circumstances 13 June 1969 no. 26” §2-1.   
 
7.7 Briefly on Alternative Legal Bases for Reimbursement 
Although the legal basis for reimbursement is primarily regulated by the provisions in the 
Pollution Act and the Maritime Code, it might also, depending on the circumstances, be 
possible to base such a claim on other sets of rules. The principle of negotiorum gestio, the 
principle of necessity and the rules on salvage represents such alternative legal bases.     
 
7.7.1 The principle of negotiorum gestio and the principle of necessity 
As far as the principles of negotiorum gestio and necessity are concerned, the PA §76 rep-
resents an example of codification of these rules.
237
 In continuation, an issue that naturally 
arises is whether or not §76 regulates these rules exhaustively, or if it can be supplied with 
these legal doctrines on a non-statutory basis. The preparatory works answer this question 
in the affirmative.
238
 Consequently, it can be relied on that §76 is a non-exhaustive rule, 
and there may be claims of reimbursement of costs based on other legal grounds. 
 
7.7.2 Salvage 
The rules concerning salvage deserve some additional comments, as they are a distinct 
characteristic of maritime law and do not have a counterpoint in any other area of law.
239
 In 
essence, these rules imply that a person who salvages the property of another – where such 
property is exposed to loss or serious damage – is entitled to claim a generous reward.240 
The entitlement to a reward is primarily based on the outcome being successful, often re-
                                                 
 
237
  Bugge (1999) p. 256.  
238
  Ot.prp. nr. 11 (1979-1980) p. 169.   
239
  Cf. Thorbjørnsen (1951) p. 20.  
240
  Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset (2011) p. 472.  
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ferred to as no cure - no pay, with certain exceptions in cases entailing a risk of pollution 
damage, cf. §§445(1) and (3) cf. 449. The salvage institute will not be accounted for in 
detail.
241
 It is, however, of relevance to highlight a few interesting matters. 
 
Salvage is subject to regulation in the Maritime Code chapter 16.
242
 It is explicitly stated in 
§442(2) second sentence that the provisions of the chapter “apply if the ship which per-
formed the salvage is owned by a State”.243 Furthermore, the apportionment of the salvage 
award when the salvage is performed by the State is regulated especially in §451(2) no 3. If 
the Coastal Administration undertakes the salvage operation of a ship, by implementing 
measures such as towage, the salvage rules may represent an alternative legal basis on 
which they can found their claim for remuneration. 
 
Under certain circumstances the use of the salvage rules may be preferable, predominantly 
because the salvage award is not subject to limitation pursuant to the MC, cf. §173 com-
pared to §§171, 172 and 172a. Additionally, the claim is secured by a maritime lien in the 
ship and cargo and is a maritime claim which entitles arrest in a ship, cf. §51(1) no. 5, §61 
no. 1 and §92(2) c). Consequently, even if there are other claims submitted towards the 
Reder, the State’s claim will be well protected.  
 
It is, however, important to be aware of the right of the Reder to refuse the salvaging of the 
vessel.
244
 If such a refusal is “reasonable” and the salvor nonetheless salves the vessel, the 
                                                 
 
241
  For a more general presentation of the institute, see Brækhus (1967) and Falkanger/Bull (2010) p. 
 442-460. 
242
  Based on the Convention on Salvage 1989, which was drafted as a result of the Amaco Cadiz 
 -accident, and replaced Salvage Convention 1910.  
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 ND-1958-247 (Astoria). 
244
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salvor is not entitled to a salvage award, cf. §450(2).
245
 Whether or not this condition is 
fulfilled has given rise to many disputes.
246
 It would be too comprehensive to go into the 
further details in this thesis, but it should be highlighted that the risk of environmental 
damage is a circumstance that may give the salvor a right to salvage the vessel against the 
wishes of the Reder, because it would not be reasonable to refuse, cf. the Tsesis-case.
247
        
 
As for the relationship between the salvage rules and other relevant legislation, it is stated 
in §442(3) that the provisions of chapter 16 have “no limiting effect on rules which other-
wise apply to salvage operations carried out by or under the supervision of public authori-
ties”.248 This statement is supposed to express that if there is a conflict between the salvage 
rules and rules that give the public authorities competence to give orders or intervene in 
such cases, the salvage rules must yield.
249
 The Pollution Act and the Harbour Act are 
listed as concrete examples.    
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  The authentic Norwegian text uses the word “berettiget” which replaced the corresponding wording
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  Selvig (2012).  
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8 Limitation of Liability 
8.1 Introduction 
Even though the Pollution Act is based on the principle idea that the polluter shall pay full 
compensation to the State for the incurred costs, the Reder/shipowner is entitled to limit his 
liability pursuant to the rules in the Maritime Code. Such limitation of liability has occurred 
several times in practice, inter alia in the cases concerning “Mercantil Marica”, “Green 
Ålesund”, “Gudrun Gisladottir” and “Rocknes”, and might be in the ongoing Server-
case.
250
  
 
In the present section, a brief introduction to the limitation rules will be given, and then two 
selected issues will be addressed; limitation of the duty to take action and conduct barring 
limitation. These issues have been chosen as they have proven particularly relevant in the 
ongoing Server-case, and are especially unclear as they have not yet been conclusively de-
cided upon by the courts.    
 
8.2 The System of Limitation of Liability 
8.2.1 Generally 
That the Reder/shipowner may limit his liability implies that he is entitled to invoke a limi-
tation amount as a limit for his economic liability. There are different schemes of limitation 
rules. Oil pollution from tanker vessels comprised by the definition in MC §191(3) are sub-
ject to regulation by the MC chapter 10 part II, while oil pollution from other vessels are 
regulated by the MC chapter 10 part I, cf. §183(3), which renders the global limitation rules 
in chapter 9 applicable, cf. §185 (2).   
 
                                                 
 
250
  The claims in the settled cases would not be limited pursuant to the present rules, because of 
 considerably higher limitation amounts, cf. Ot.prp.nr.77 (2006-2007) p. 9.  
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The limitation amounts are laid down according to the ships gross tonnage, and calculated 
in SDR, cf. §§194, 175 and 175a.
251
 The access to invoke the limitation rules for tanker 
vessels is dependent on the establishment of a limitation fund according to MC chapter 12, 
cf. §195(1), while this is not a requirement for other vessels. If the total claim that is sub-
mitted exceeds the limitation amount, the claimants must settle for a dividend; a propor-
tional distribution of the fund will take place. Thus, the State may have to compete with 
other claimants when seeking reimbursement.   
 
8.2.2 Claims subject to limitation and parties entitled to limitation 
For tanker vessels, liability may be limited according to §194 for claims that fall within the 
definition of oil pollution damage in §191 a)-b). This definition has been accounted for 
previously. For bunker oil pollution, on the other hand, the claims subject to limitation are 
listed in §§172 and 172a. In practice, the higher limitation amounts in §175a will usually 
apply.
252
 Emergency discharging of bunkers, removing wrecks and cleaning of the sea and 
shoreline are typical measures comprised, cf. §175a no 1.
253
  
 
The right to limitation only concerns claims arising out of the same event. What constitutes 
the same event is defined differently for bunker pollution and pollution from tanker vessels, 
compare §§175 no 4 cf. 175a(2) and 194(3).
254
 When claiming reimbursement for costs 
related to a clean-up operation, the accident itself will usually represent the relevant event. 
However, incidents that constitute new events may occur during the clean-up operation, 
e.g. while towing or discharging. Reference can be made to the Server-accident, where a 
new oil spill occurred while discharging oil from the wrecked ship, because the oil pump 
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  Special Drawing Right, cf. MC §505.  
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  Falkanger/Bull/Bautaset (2010) p. 218.  
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  Ot.prp.nr.77 (2006-2007) p. 9.  
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 Dolsøy) and ND-1987-274 (arbitration-case).   
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was not stopped in time. Since the spill took place one month after the grounding and was 
not a direct result of the grounding, but an operational error, the incident constituted a new 
event.
255
   
 
Questions regarding who is entitled to submit claims to the limitation fund have been 
somewhat disputed.
256
 For bunker oil pollution the Reder/shipowner cannot submit the in-
curred costs that are comprised by §172 no 4
257
, but is entitled to submit the costs com-
prised by §§175a, cf. 179. Likewise, for tanker vessels the Reder/shipowner may submit 
costs for measures that are “voluntarily” undertaken, cf. §195(3). Whether measures are 
undertaken voluntarily when orders are imposed by the Coastal Administration pursuant to 
§7(4) is not immediately clear. A categorical answer cannot be given; presumably it de-
pends on the concrete circumstances, e.g. considering the nature of the order and the possi-
bility of the Reder/shipowner to initiate measures before orders are given. Regard should 
also be given to the desire to promote the motivation of the Reder/shipowner to implement 
measures himself. As the Reder/shipowner can submit claims to the fund, the State’s reim-
bursement claim may have to compete with these claims.        
     
8.3 Limitation of the Duty to Take Action 
A particular issue that arises in connection with the right to limit liability is whether the 
Reder/shipowner is entitled to limit his duty to take action, cf. the PA §§7(2), (4) and 37. In 
other words, if the limitation amount restricts the orders imposed by the Coastal Admin-
istration, and thereby constitutes an upper limit for the duty to take action.  
 
In accidents of a certain magnitude, the Coastal Administration will usually undertake the 
clean-up operation and claim reimbursement from the Reder/shipowner. This reimburse-
                                                 
 
255
  Serverrapporten section 5.3.2.2. 
256
  Also in English law, cf. (1971) Lloyd’s Rep. 341 H. 
257
  NOU 2002:15 p. 15 and NOU 1980:55 p. 18. 
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ment claim is subject to limitation. Thus, if the claim exceeds the limitation amount, the 
Reder/shipowner will not be burdened with the excess costs. However, if the Coastal Ad-
ministration orders the Reder/shipowner to undertake the measures cf. the PA §7(4), he 
must bear the associated expenses and may submit a claim to the limitation fund to partially 
recover the costs, cf. MC §§172a and 175a. Hence, if the Reder/shipowner could limit the 
duty to take action, this would represent a more economically advantageous option because 
the Reder/shipowner could refuse to take any further action and disregard the order.  
 
On one hand, one may claim that such limitation is possible, due to the wording in 
§172a(1) which entitles limitation “regardless of the basis of the liability”. This phrase 
might imply that liability based on an issued order pursuant to the Pollution Act is also in-
cluded. Furthermore, it may be held that not allowing limitation of the duty to take action 
would circumvent the limitation rules, as the Coastal Administration can inflict more ex-
tensive liability on the Reder/shipowner through issuing orders than it can through imple-
menting the measures themselves and claiming reimbursement. This follows from the fact 
that the State’s additional claim may be limited, while the Reder’s/shipowner’s expenses 
would be submittable to the fund and settled by a dividend from the limitation amount. It is 
not desirable that the economic liability of the person responsible is dependent on the 
Coastal Administration’s choice of procedure. Consequently, refusing limitation of the duty 
might lead to arbitrariness and unpredictability from the Reder’s/shipowner’s point of 
view.  
 
On the other hand, it may be argued that the wording of §§172 and 172a favours a different 
interpretation. The provisions use the term “claim”, which refers to the 
Reder’s/shipowner’s economic responsibility, more specifically, to monetary claims. This 
must be clear, seeing that the provisions concern costs and economic losses. The preparato-
ry works support such an interpretation of the wording.
258
 Hence, the wording “regardless 
                                                 
 
258
  The historical development evidences that the wording concerns monetary claims, see inter alia 
 Ot.prp.nr.13 (1929) p. 10 and 56 which concerned the implementation of the Brussels Convention 
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of the basis of the liability”, refers to the basis of this monetary claim. That the basis for the 
monetary claim is an imposed order should therefore not imply that the issued order is sub-
ject to limitation.   
 
Furthermore, the legislative history indicates that limitation of the duty to take action 
should not be admitted. Of special interest are the statements given in relation to the en-
actment of “act 17.June 2005 no 88”, which concerns limitation amounts relating to clean-
up efforts. NOU 2002:15 contained a proposal for implementing a new provision 182e, 
regulating conduct barring limitation, with the purpose of clarifying the relationship be-
tween the right to limitation of liability and the responsibility for preforming duties based 
in statute or in issued orders.
259
 The proposal was dismissed, inter alia because of objec-
tions from the Ministry of Environment, which asserted that it would lead to a disregarding 
of the duty to take action pursuant to the Pollution Act on behalf of the limitation rules in 
the Maritime Code.
260
 The NOU is also of interest when commenting on §179, which in-
troduces the Reder’s right to submit the costs of his own measures to the limitation fund. 
When read in conjunction, the NOU’s presentation of the state of law seems to presuppose 
that the duty to take action is not limited by the limitation amount.
261
 
 
Moreover, the preparatory works of “act 12. June 2009 no 37”, which concerned increasing 
of the limitation amounts, provides additional guidance of the issue. The Ministry of Justice 
and Public Security emphasises in the proposition that the “…duty to take action according 
to the Pollution Act applies in full, regardless of whether the costs of the measures is higher 
than the limitation amount pursuant to the Maritime Code”.262 Additionally, it states that; 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
 1924, and Ot.prp.nr.13 (1963-1964) p. 9, which concerned the Brussels Convention 1957. See also 
 NOU 1980:55 p. 15-16, concerning the implementation of the London Convention 1976.    
259
  NOU 2002:15 p. 40 and 46.  
260
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261
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262
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“[t]he limitation amount in the Maritime Code has […] no effect on the extent of the duty 
of the person responsible to implement measures pursuant to the Pollution Act”.263 These 
statements were endorsed unanimously by the Standing Committee on Justice.
264
     
 
It is also of relevance that policy considerations adhere to the solution that the 
Reder/shipowner is not entitled to limit the duty to take action. That is, because it may 
cause practical difficulties to determine at which point in time the limitation amount is 
reached, and thus when the right to limit the duty arises. During a complicated operation, 
the existence of such a right would lead to uncertainty, seeing that the Reder’s/shipowner’s 
initial duty to take action would suddenly cease to apply.  
 
An additional circumstance that one should be aware of is that if a right to limitation of the 
duty is admitted, this would also have consequences for the possibility to incur criminal 
liability, cf. the PA §§78(1) b) cf. 7. Considerations regarding coherence in the legislation 
therefore indicate that such limitation should not be allowed. Furthermore, the rationale 
behind many of the rules is that the Reder/shipowner shall be motivated to undertake 
measures himself.
265
 This rationale will, however, be directly contradicted if a right to limi-
tation of the duty to take action is permitted.      
 
The conclusion is therefore that the duty to take action is not subject to limitation, and the 
limitation rules will thus not restrict the orders issued by Coastal Administration. Conse-
quently, the duties pursuant to the PA are still functioning, even though the limitation rules 
in the MC are applicable. The fact that this solution will entail a difference in the responsi-
ble party’s economic liability depending on which procedure the Authorities chooses is 
unfortunate, but does not alter the conclusion.      
 
                                                 
 
263
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264
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265
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 88 
8.4 Conduct Barring Limitation  
Limitation of liability is regarded as a distinct feature of maritime law. However, allowing 
such limitation may seem unreasonable if the liable party has caused the damages by repre-
hensible conduct.  
 
Therefore, limitation of liability is not permitted if it is proved that the party entitled to lim-
itation caused the damages “deliberately” or “through gross negligence and with 
knowledge that such damage would probably result”, cf. MC §§174 and 194(3). The provi-
sions are interpreted in accordance with general principles of tort law, which implies that 
both actions and omissions are included.
266
   
 
The first alternative, that the error must have been committed deliberately, means that the 
wrongful act must be intentional. In such situations the liability is clearly unlimited.
267
 The 
second alternative firstly prescribes that the error must be committed with gross negli-
gence. According to case law, this implies that the action/omission represents “a clear devi-
ation from ordinary reasonable behaviour” and that this behaviour is “particularly blame-
worthy” where the person is “significantly more to blame than where there is a question of 
ordinary negligence”.268 Thus, the main question is whether the deviation from ordinary 
conduct is sufficiently clear and blameworthy to lose the right to limitation.
269
 However, 
gross negligence is not enough, as the person additionally must have had the knowledge 
that the loss would probably result. Hence, the standard is set to conscious gross negli-
gence.
270
 Consequently, the provision requires both that there must be a causal connection 
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between the actions/omissions and the loss, and that the actual loss appeared as a likely 
result of the reprehensible actions/omissions.
271
 
 
Seeing that the person who acted wrongfully must have acted intentionally or with gross 
negligence and with knowledge – at the present time – that damage would probably result, 
the threshold is set very high. Furthermore, it is not the right to limitation as such that is 
lost if the criteria are met, it is only the right to limit the losses deriving from the specific 
wrongful act/omission.
272
 Accordingly, while the right to limitation will be barred for these 
losses, the right to limitation may be intact for other losses arising out of the accident. 
There must thus be a causal link between the loss and the act of privity.
273
      
 
As a consequence it is necessary to separate between losses deriving from wrongful 
acts/omissions relating to the maritime casualty, and losses which occurs as a result of the 
subsequent risk that the maritime casualty entails.
274
 If a ship accidentally runs aground, the 
losses related thereto will be subject to limitation. However, if the person responsible does 
not take any additional steps to prevent or mitigate further damage, one might ask if the 
losses resulting from this omission are comprised by §§174 and 194(3), and therefore ex-
empted from limitation.  
 
In this respect, the independent duty to take action and the duty to carry out orders imposed 
by the Coastal Administration are naturally of interest. As a starting point, one must assess 
whether the failure to act in accordance with these duties are deliberate or consciously 
                                                 
 
271
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grossly negligent, and that there is a causal link between the failure and the occurred loss. 
According to the preparatory works, there will “normally be a deliberate or grossly negli-
gent breach of the duty to take action from the Reder” when the duty follows “directly from 
the legislation or is concretised by a specific order”.275 In these situations it is therefore a 
presumption that the Reder/shipowner had the necessary knowledge, and neglecting the 
duty represents a deliberate omission. The subjective criteria for losing the right to limita-
tion are therefore fulfilled.  
 
It should be emphasised that the subject of liability pursuant to §§174 and 194(3) is the 
“liable party”, which means that the error must be committed by a person with a right to 
limit liability. Generally, questions concerning who should be regarded as the liable party 
may cause some difficulties, as the Rederi usually is organised through some form of a 
company or corporation. This is essentially a question of identification; which company 
bodies and employees should be equated with the Reder/shipowner. The assessment is con-
crete, with the presumption that errors committed by management personnel with a fairly 
significant level of responsibility will result in identification.
276
 Thus, this will normally not 
cause any problems when an order is issued, as the board or persons at a senior manage-
ment level would be the addressee of the order. However, in acute situations it is conceiva-
ble that other personnel, such as the master, may have a duty to take action, based on an 
order or in statute. The master’s failure to follow an order can as a starting point not be 
equated with the Reder/shipowner
277
, even when the Reder/shipowner serves as the master 
himself and acts in this capacity.
278
 The consequence of not identifying the acts/omissions 
of the master with the Reder/shipowner is that the limitation right will be intact for the 
Rederi, while the master will lose his right to limitation. 
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Although the Reder/shipowner normally will lose the right to limitation when issued orders 
are not complied with, some reservations must be made. Firstly, the order must obviously 
be lawful and definitive.
279
 Secondly, if carrying out the requested measures is impossible 
for the person responsible, he will not lose right to limitation.
280
 This is in line with the 
long-established principle impossibilium nulla obligation est.
281
 Such impossibility might 
occur if the weather does not render it possible to initiate the imposed orders. That the 
weather can cause significant operational difficulties was experienced inter alia in the Go-
dafoss- and Petrozavodsk-accidents. Thirdly, if it is certain that the ordered measures 
would not be suitable for the purpose, the omission is not comprised by §§174 and 
194(3).
282
 After all, in such a situation it is clear that carrying out the order would not have 
had any effect and it would accordingly not be reasonable to deprive the Reder/shipowner 
of his right to limitation.       
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9 Concluding Observations 
Through the study conducted in this thesis, it is possible to provide some final remarks 
about the regulation of state intervention and claim for reimbursement in the wake of a ma-
rine oil spill incident.  
 
For one, it is clear that maritime oil pollution is subject to regulation in several parallel and 
partly overlapping sets of rules, especially within the Pollution Act and the Maritime Code. 
As a consequence, the regulations are not easily accessible and stand out as complex and 
somewhat fragmented. With respect to the MC, the leeway of the authorities is limited as 
the regulations are based on conventions and must be practiced in accordance with the ob-
ligations it entails. Thus, amending the rules is not feasible. The authorities are, on the oth-
er hand, provided with more flexibility in relation to the Pollution Act. It would certainly 
be possible to amend the statute, so that the relationship between the rules concerning claim 
for reimbursement and claim for compensation gets elucidated. That the interrelation be-
tween these two central sets of rules is somewhat unresolved is surprising. A clarification 
would be natural either when the rules on compensation were incorporated in the act or 
subsequently.                  
 
Moreover, it is evident that the public authorities enjoy wide discretionary competence 
when intervening in marine oil pollution incidents. From the perspective of society as such, 
this is solely positive. The environment is so essential that it should be highly prioritised. 
However, from a Reder’s (and the insurers) point of view, it may be argued that the judici-
ary should have a greater competence to review the discretion exerted, since it entails such 
dramatic consequences.   
 
The Reder’s legal protection is first and foremost secured by the right to limitation of liabil-
ity. This principle is a distinct characteristic of maritime law, and in general contrary to the 
society’s conceptions of reasonableness and righteousness. Only when the Reder has acted 
with a sufficient degree of culpability will he lose the right to limitation, and the polluter-
pays principle is carried out in full also in marine oil pollution incidents.   
 93 
A final observation is that the regulatory framework provided in the Pollution Act does not 
always seem to fit the reality of the shipping industry. The principal duties which are in-
cumbent on the Reder pursuant to the PA are not practical when a maritime oil spill occurs. 
However, it must be borne in mind that the PA aims to be the general act concerning pollu-
tion in Norway, and it is therefore difficult to make a statute of such a generic character suit 
specifically for all types of pollution. After all, maritime oil pollution is just a small part of 
what the PA is intended to cover.   
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